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In some of the states it is provided by statute that a prisoner
shall be entitled to bail, if, without just ground therefor, the prosecutor allows a term to pass without trial. But bail cannot be
claimed as a matter of right for this cause when no such statutory
provision exists. Delay in bringing on the trial, on the part of the
prosecutor, without just cause, might be sufficient ground to induce
the court to exercise the discretionary power of admitting to bail.
But the circumstances must be very strong to induce the court to
allow bail for such a cause: 3 Wash. 224.
T-os. F. DAVIDSON.
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JAMES E. CLAWSON v. JOSEPH PRIMROSE.
The English doctrine of presumptive title to light and air received over land
of another person, arising from the uninterrupted enjoyment of it for twenty
years and upward, through the window of a dwelling-house, was part of the common law of England and of the colonies at the period of American Independence,
and as such continued to be the law of Delaware under the constitution of the
state adopted at the organization of the state government in 1776.
A court of equity will restrain the obstruction of lights by erections on adjoining
land, even where the right is unquestioned or established, only when the privation
of light and air by a proposed erection will be in such degree as to render the
occupation of the complainant's house uncomfortable, if it be a dwelling-house, or
if it be a place of business, the privation must render the exercise of the business
niaterially less beneficial than it had formerly been.
A fair test of what is such a privation of light, etc., is the fact that a jury would
give substantial and not merely nominal damages.
Construction of that clause of the Constitution of 1776, declaring the common
law of England to be in force in this state.
Principles for determining what parts of the English common law are inapplicable in this country.

BILr in equity. The complainant was the owner and occupier
of a dwelling-house, situated in the town of Smyrna, and adjoining,*
on the northerly side, an unimproved lot of the defendant. In the
complainant's house were several windows overlooking the defendant's lot, through which light and air were received into the
house. At what precise time these windows were opened, did not
appear; but it was proved that they had been in their present
condition, and used by the successive owners and occupiers of the
dwelling-house, for a period of over thirty-five years past. The
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defendant being about to remove a frame tenement to the lot, and
to locate it against the northerly side of the dwelling-house, so as
wholly to darken the windows, the bill was filed for an injunction
to restrain the proposed obstruction. The material facts touching
the precise location of the windows and the effect of the obstruction, are stated in the opinion of the chancellor.
J. Alexander Fulton, for the complainant.
George V. Mlassey, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Chancellor.-Two preliminary objections were taken to
the relief sought by the bill. One of them was this: that even
conceding to the complainant the right claimed to receive light
and air over the defendant's lot, yet that the proposed obstruction
will not impair his enjoyment of the dwelling-house in such degree
as to warrant the interference of a court of equity, but that he
should be left to seek redress in damages at law. The rule on
this point, as first announced by Lord ELDON, inAttorney General
v. Nicehol, 16 Yes. Jr. 337, and followed in all subsequent cases,
is, that a court of equity does not in all cases restrain the obstruction of lights by erections on adjoining land, even though the
right is unquestioned or established, but only when the privation
of light and air by a proposed erection will be in such degree as
to render the occupation of the complainant's house uncomfortable,
if it be a dwelling-house, or, if it be a place of business, the privation must render the exercise of the business materially less beneficial than it had formerly been: TIynstanly v. Lee, 2 Swanst.
358; Sutton v. Lord fontfort, 6 Eng. Oh. R. 257; Dent v. Auction Hart Co., L. R. 2 Equity Cases 238. In the latter case, Sir
W3i. PAGE WOOD, V.-O., enables us, by an easy test, to determine
what is such a substantial privation of light and air as should
induce this court to relieve. He says "that where substantial
damages would be given at law, as distinguished from some small
sum of 51., 101. or 201., the court will interpose; and on this
ground, that it cannot be contended that those who are minded to
erect a building that will inflict injury upon their neighbor have a
right to purchase him out without an Act of Parliament for that
purpose having been obtained."
In the present case, the threatened obstruction, if the complainant's title be conceded, is sufficient, within the rule, to be the
BATES,
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subject of equitable relief. The windows on the north side of the
house overlooking the defendant's lot will be wholly closed. One
of these is in the cellar, and without this window there could be
no means of lighting, and airing the cellar. Another window is
in the kitchen,. at the rear of the dwelling. The kitchen would be
left with one window on the opposite or south side. Another
window is in the attic, at present the only window in that part
of the house, though a witness states that other arrangements
might be made for lighting that part of the house.
Another, and the most important of the windows threatened, is
on the north side of the dining-room. There is no window on the
south side of the dining-room opening out of doors. There was
such a window in former years opening into a covered porch, but
some sixteen years since the porch was enclosed and made a part
of the interior of the house. It so remains. Mr. Stockley, who
occupied the house before the porch was enclosed, testifies that,
even with the south window opened as it then was, the room could
not be comfortably lighted or ventilated without the north window,
the porch having a roof so low and wide as to admit but little light
and air. It must be sufficiently apparent that the obstruction
of these windows will very materially impair the complainant's
enjoyment of his property.
But it is objected further that the complainant, having an open
space on the south side of his house, can by other arrangements
supply the deficiency of light and air, and that there is therefore
no necessity for the interference of the court. Without stopping
to inquire whether adequate arrangements of that kind could be
made, it is enough to say that such a consideration is not admissible to affect the right of the complainant to enjoy his property
after the manner in which he previously held it. If the English
doctrine of ancient lights be our law, and the complainant has by
twenty years' user acquired a title to this 'Iservitude, most clearly
the title gained is the right to enjoy his dwelling as he has so long
held it, and he cannot be compelled to alter his house so as to suit
the convenience of his neighbor. This principle has been recently
adjudged by V.-C. Sir Wmt. PAGE WOOD, in the case of Dent et al.
v. The Auction 11fart Co., before cited. There the injunction was
sought against the erection of a house at some short distance from
the complainant's house, the effect being partially to darken a
window, and one of the defences was that the complainant could
avoid the injury by enlarging his window. But the defence was
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not sustained. "The complainants," says the V.-O., "are clearly
entitled to retain the right as they acquired it, without being compelled to make any alterations in their house to enable other people
to deal with their property." I have found no other case on this
point in England or in America, though after diligent search.
We are then brought univoidably to the main question in controversy, viz.: whether in this state the uninterrupted enjoyment,
by the owner of a tenement, of light and air received laterally over
the land of another for more than twenty years, raises a title to
the future unobstructed use of the same.
Incorporated rights generally - such as ways, water-courses,
&c.-are the subjects of piesumptive title, arising from twenty
years' adverse user, by analogy to the statute limiting entries into
lands, and that both in England and in this country. In England
this general doctrine of presumptive title to incorporeal rights or
easements includes, as one of them, the enjoyment of light and air.
Does the law of presumptive title in this'state, in like manner,
extend to light and air ? That is the question.
A careful reading of all that could be found to bear upon the
subject, with much reflection, leads me irresistibly to the conclusion, that the doctrine of presumptive title to light and air from
twenty years' enjoyment, as it was held in England prior to the
statute of 3 & 4 Will. IV. (which simply converted the presumption of title into an absolute bar), was a part of the common law
of title to real estate in England at the period of our separation
from that country, and that by force of the constitution of this
state, adopted in the year of its independence, that doctrine became the law of this state, subject only to alteration by the legislature.
The Constitution of September 20th 1776, adopted upon our
separation from England and organization into an independent
state government, provides, by art. 25, that "the common law
of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has been
heretofore adopted in practice in this state, shall remain in force,
unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature, such
parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges
contained in this constitution and the declaration of rights, &c.,
agreed to by this convention :" 1 Delaware Laws, Appendix,
p. 89.
The object of this clause was to secure to the people, in their
'VOL. XXIV.-2
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transition from a colonial to an independent political state, a jurisprudence already complete, and adequate immediately to define
and to protect their rights of person and property, and of citizenship generally, without awaiting the slow growth of a new system
to be thereafter matured by legislation and judicial decisions.
They had already, in their colonial state, as subjects of Great
Britain, an established jurisprudence in the common law of England. It was a system of jurisprudence to which our ancestors
of that day were deeply attached. They had esteemed it, throughout their colonial condition, to be their birthright, as English
subjects, and their safest rule of conduct, so declaring it in several
legislative acts. See Preamble to Act of 1719, 1 Del. Laws 64.
This attachment to the common law pervaded all the colonies.
The Congress of 1774, in its enunciation of certain fundamental
rights and immunities, which were claimed for the American
subjects of Great Britain, placed among the foremost of them the
declaration that they were entitled to the common law of England,
as also to such English statutes as were in force at the date of
their colonization, and which, by experience, they had found applicable to their circumstances: 1 Story's Constitution, sect. 158, n.
The provision of our state constitution of 1776, adopting for the
new state government the body of the common law, and in part the
statutes of England, is the same in substance with the declaration
of the Congress of 1774 of what had before been held to be the
force of the English common and statutory law in the colonies;
and the obvious purpose and effect of the 24th article of the constitution were to give to the common law in this state, by constitutional adoption, the same force under the new government which,
in their previous political condition, it had by virtue of their colonial relationship to the mother country. By the common law was
of course meant the common law of England as it then stood, so
far as it was applicable to the circumstances of the people, and was
not repugnant, as the constitution expresses it, "to the rights and
privileges contained in that instrument and the declaration of
rights."
We now come to the two principal questions raised by the argument, viz.:1. Whether the English doctrine of a presumptive title to light
and air from twenty years' enjoyment, by analogy to the statute
of 21 James I., was part of the common law of England prior to
1776; and
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2. If so, whether, under our state constitution of 1776, it
became the law of this state.
First, then, was the English doctrine part of the common law
prior to 1776 ?
It has sometimes been spoken of as a modern doctrine. Its
origin has been referred to two or three judicial decisions made
between the year 1761 and 1786, viz: Lewis v. Price, Dougal v.
Wilson and Darwin v. Uton. Even were these cases taken to
have first incorporated the doctrine into the English common law,
they would carry it back to a period anterior to our state constitution of 1776. But it will be strictly correct to say that the
English doctrine is in its principle a very ancient one. The
principle is that uninterrupted user raises a prescriptive title to
incorporeal rights and to the servitude of light and air as one of
these incorporeal rights. This has been a principle of the common law from the beginning. It is true that the prescriptive
period, or the duration of the user requisite to raise the prescriptive
title, has been modified several times in the lapse of the last three
centuries, but the principle of prescriptive title has all the while
been the same. The last change of the prescriptive period, that
which reduced it to twenty years by analogy to the Statute of
James, was adopted long prior to the American Revolution, and
from the time of its first adoption by judicial decision applying it
to any species of incorporeal rights, it became the law of all such
rights, and among them, of the servitude of light and air, before
even the cases just referred to for its actual application to this
particular servitude bad occurred. This is but a general view of
the subject. Let us examine, as briefly as can be done intelligibly,
the grounds on which it rests. They may be reduced to three
well established facts of judicial history.
First. It is beyond any doubt whatever that the ancient common law of presumptive title to incorporeal rights founded on immemorial user, included and protected the enjoyment of light and
air as one species of such incorporeal rights. This was held to be
settled law as far back as the 28th Elizabeth, in Bland v. Manly,
cited in Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 58. That was an action at
law for the obstruction of the lights of a dwelling-house alleged in
the narr. to have been enjoyed from time immemorial, i. e., time
whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, which
was the prescriptive period then in force. The obstruction was
by the erection of a new building on the adjoining land of the
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defendant. The Court of King's Bench sustained the action
holding the prescription from time whereof the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary, sufficient to raise a presumption that
originally there had been a grant of the privilege of having the
windows unobstructed. Following this case and extending through
the long interval which elapsed before the prescriptive period was
finally reduced to the present limitation of twenty years by analogy
to the Statute of 21 James I., there were many cases, which though
they did not all directly adjudge a title to light to have been
acquired by the user, set up in. the particular case, nevertheless
fully recognised the servitude of light and air as being equally and
alike with all other incorporeal rights and easements the subjects
of a prescriptive title: Pope v. Berry (29 & 30 Eliz.), Cro. Eliz.
118 ; Leon. 168; Palmer v. Fletcher (15 Car. II.), 1 Levinz 122;
Villiers v. Ball (1 W. & M.), 1 Show. 7 ; Bo.Rewell v. Pryor, (2
Anne), 6 Mod. 116; 2 Salk. 459; 1 Ld. Raym. 392. Thus we
see beyond any question that the rule of prescriptive title as to
incorporeal rights, as at first settled in the common law, protected,
as one of those -rights equally and on precisely the same footing
with others, the one now under consideration.
But here we meet the fact that the ancient law of pr.escription
has undergone several successive modifications, and that the present inquiry is not whether the servitude of light and air was protected by the common law of the reign of Elizabeth, but whether
by the latter rule of title presumed from twenty years' possession
by analogy to the Statute of James I.
Second. This brings us to observe a second fact in the history
of this subject, which is that under the several successive modifications of the English law of prescriptive title, commencing with the
most ancient rule of prescription from immemorial user up to and
including the comparatively modern rule of presumptive title from
twenty years' enjoyment, by analogy to the Statute of James, the
rule, however modified at any period of its history, continued to be
applied as well to the servitude of light and air as to any other
species of incorporeal rights. The modifications undergone were
not such as to narrow at all the scope or application of the rule of
prescriptive title, so as to exclude at any period a species of incorp6real right which had previously been protected, but their whole
operation was simply to reduce from time to time the period of
prescription so as to conform it to the limitations in force for the
time being for entries into lands. Let us dwell a moment here

bLAWSON v. PRATROSE.

and see if such was not the true purpose and effect of the successive changes in the law of prescriptive title.
The policy just stated, of conforming the period of prescription
to incorporeal rights with the statutory limitation for real actions,
so as to give uniformity to the mode of acquiring possessory titles
to both species of real estate, has obtained from the earliest times.
Thus when by the Statute of Westminster 2, ch. 46, 3 Edw. I.,
the coronation of Richard I. was fixed as the period of legal memory
within which a seisin must be proved in order to maintain a writ of
right, it was from thenceforth adopted as the convenient period of
legal memory for all purposes and became the prescriptive period
for acquiring title to incorporeal rights as well as to lands. So
stood the rule until the Statute of 32 Henry VIII. fixed a progressive period of limitation, sixty years, for writs of right. After
this time, although, as it seems, the period of Richard's reign continued to be nominally adhered to as the beginning of legal
memory for the purpose of working an absolute bar, yet in analogy
to the Statute of Henry VIII., sixty years' possession came to be
considered as sufficient evidence of an enjoyment from the reign
of Richard I., so as to raise a title, unless rebutted by proof that the
possession or user commenced subsequently to his reign. As such
proof could rarely be made, the sixty years became practically the
measure of legal memory." Thus the law stood until the Statute
of 21 James I., which limited entries into lands to twenty years.
It was by analogy to this statute that twenty years was afterward
adopted as the requisite period of user for raising a presumptive title to incorporeal rights, with this difference, however, that
whereas, under the statute, twenty years' adverse possession of land
I There is some confusion in the different writers' statement of the law of this
period, some holding that the ancient period of legal memory, i. e. from the beginning of the reign of Richard I., continued, unaffected by the Statute of 32 Henry
2 Wend. Block. 31, n. (21) ; while others considered that this statute was
VII:
equitably extended to incorporeal rights as had previously been the Statute of
Westminster, ch. 20; Gale & Whatley on Easements 64-5. The probable solution of this apparent disagreement of authorities is, that for the purpose of working a conclusive bar, the reign of Richard I. was adhered to as the beginning of
legal memory: but that the Statute of Henry VIII. limiting writs of right to sixty
years, was so far extended, as to make the enjoyment of an incorporeal right for
that length of time evidence sufficient, if unrebutted, to prove such enjoyment had
commenced as far back as the reign of Richard I. As the rebutting proof could
rarely be made, the sixty years' possession practically became the measure of immemorial user, and thus was sufficient to raise a title though a presumptive one
only, and not one operating as an absolute bar. The point is, however, only of
historical interest.
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worked an absolute bar, the twenty years' enjoyment of an incorporeal right was held to raise only a presumptive title by grant
which might be rebutted: 2 Wins. Saund. 175, note (2); 2 Wend.
Black. 266, note (10): 1 C., M. & R. 217; Gale & Whatley
on Easements 65. And so the rule stood until the Statute 8 &
4 Will. III., which in effect converted what before was only a
presumptive title into an absolute bar, fixing for the first time
different periods for, different classes of easements ; among the rest
fixing twenty years, as the period for raising a title to light and
air. Baron PARK in 1 0.1 M. & R. 217.
Third. We come now to notice a third point in the history of
this subject, which will show quite clearly that the rule of presumptive title from twenty years' possession to the servitude of
light and air was part of the common law many years prior to the
American Revolution. The point is this: that whenever the rule
of presumptive title from twenty years' possession by analogy to
the Statute of James was adopted for incorporeal rights generally,
it b(came thenceforth, by its own force, the law of title to light
and air as one species of incorporeal rights, without awaiting the
occurrence of an adjudicated case of the application of the modified rule to these particular rights ; otherwise we should have this
result, that while a title to some kinds of incoiporeal rights might
be gained by twenty years' enjoyment by analogy to the Statute
of James, others, or at least one species, that of light and air, would
remain under the old doctrine of immemorial presumption requiring
a period of sixty years. And thus the very principle upon which
the analogy of the Statute of James was adopted, viz. : to give
uniformity to the term required for raising possessory titles, would
fail at the point where it was of most value: for certainly such
uniformity of title is more important among different kinds of incorporeal rights themselves than as between incorporeal rights and
lands-clearly then the very principle upon which the equitable
extension of the Statute of James proceeded, necessarily made it
applicable from its first adoption to every species of incorporeal
right. Every statement or explanation in the books, of this rule
of analogy to the Statute of James, will be found to give it this
broad and unqualified scope. So Lord MANSFIELD puts it when
he says that "an incorporeal right," i. e., any incorporeal right,
"which if existing must be in constant use ought to be decided
by analogy to the Statute of Limitations :" Gale & Whatley 66.
And Mr. Sergeant Williams, hardly less an authority on such
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subjects, in his note to Yard v. Ford, 8 Wins. Saund. 175, in his
explanation of the ground of the change, shows at the same time
its scope and its uniform application to all incorporeal rights of
every description.
We are now prepared for the direct question: when did the present
English doctrine of presumptive title to light and air from twenty
years' enjoyment become a part of the common law? The answer
is, that whenever the ancient prescriptive period of immemorial
user, measured at first from the reign of Richard I., as a fixed
period, and afterward by sixty years, was abandoned as to immemorial rights finally, and in lieu of it the rule of twenty years, by
analogy to the Statute of James, was adopted by judicial decisions,
which applied the modified rule to any incorporeal right whatever,
it became thenceforth the law of all incorporeal rights, and as well
the law of title to the enjoyment of light and air as to any other
species of right. For the rule of analogy when applied to the
first species of incorporeal right, which called for its application,
was adopted as the law of the whole and thus became by judicial
decision the law of the whole.
At what time, we may then inquire, was the equitable extension
of the Statute of James admitted as to, any incorporeal right?
The precise date it is not easy to determine. So great a reduction
of the prescriptive period as from sixty years to twenty years, the
courts, in the conservative spirit of that age, were slow to sanction ;
and through several reigns following that of James I., the cases
proceed upon the old doctrine of immemorial user. It was not
until early in the eighteenth century that, pressed by the inconvenience and often impossibility of proving an enjoyment beyond
legal memory, even after sixty years had become the measure of
such legal memory, and also yielding to the importance of a reasonable uniformity in the law of possessory titles to real estate, the
courts admitted the equitable extension of the Statute of James to
incorporeal rights, so far as to hold twenty years' possession to be
not a bar, but presumptive only of an original title by grant. It
is certain, however, that this extension of the statute was adopted
and fully incorporated in the common law of England prior to
American Independence. The cases, though not numerous, are
decisive. One case will serve to show that the presumption of
title from twenty years' enjoyment of an incorporeal right was the
common law rule as early as 1722, fifty years before our independence: Keymer v. Summers, Buller's N. P. 74; 8 Wins. Saund.
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175 b. The question there concerned a right of way over an adjoining close claimed by the plaintiff under a deed for a tenement
"with all ways therewith used," the deed being executed by a third
person not a party to the suit. The deed was made in 1753. The
plaintiff's grantor had, in fact, as far back as 1723, leased the adjoining close to the defendant for three lives without any reservation of the way. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's grantor had from
1723 to 1753 exercised the right of way without obstruction; and
the point decided was that this user for twenty years raised in the
grantor a presumptive title to the right of way sufficient to pass
by his deed made in 1753.
Thus far we have considered the question as though no judicial
decision holding this particular servitude of light and air to be within the rule of analogy to the Statute of James had occurred prior
to 1776, and even had no such case occurred before that date we
should be obliged to hold the doctrine as having been then a part
of the common law. But it does certainly appear that before the
period of our separation from Great Britain, cases for the application of the new term of twenty years' presumption by analogy to
the statute, of light and air, did occur, and the courts without any
doubt or hesitation held that the rule long before settled as a
general one, extended to this species of incorporeal right. This
was done in a series of cases, both in the King's Bench and
Common Pleas. These are Lewis v. Price,in 1761, Dougal v.
Rilson, in 1769, and Darwin v. Upton, in 1789, all reported in
3 Wins. Saund. 175, n. 3. The first two of these cases were
prior to our independence, but no great stress need be laid on that
fact. For, according to the true force of these decisions, they are
to be taken not as introducing a new rule operating from their
date, but rather as judicial declarations of the law previously in
force. In this view, that is, as judicial evidence of what the law
had been on this point, Darwin v. Upton, also, though decided
in 1789, a few years after American Independence, is of equal
force with the two cases prior to 1776 ; and of great value indeed
is that decision as a confirmation of the prior cases ; for it was a
decision by the Court of King's Bench sitting in banc and upon
much consideration. It is worth while to examine these cases together: Lewis v. Price, in 1761, was an action on the case for
obstructing the plaintiff's lights. The plaintiff's enjoyment of the
obstructed lights extended back forty years, less than the old presumptive period of sixty years, required prior to the Statute of
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James. Yet WILMOT, J., held that the action would lie, stating
the rule as then understood thus: " that twenty years is sufficient
to give a man a title in ejectment on which he may recover the
house itself, and he saw no reason why it should not be sufficient
to entitle him to any easement belonging to the house." This
effect of the enjoyment for twenty years and upward, he says, "is
founded upon the same reason as when the lights have been immemorial, for this is long enough to induce a presumption that there
was originally some agreement between the parties." In Dougal
v. Vilson, in 1769, which came before the same judge sitting as
chief justice, there had been a possession of a house with lights from
fifty to sixty years. He held that it could not be disturbed, but not
resting his decision upon the length of enjoyment in that case, for
he expressed his opinion to be, that "a much shorter tinme than
sixty years might be sufficient," clearly referring to the modification of the old rule of prescription, after the Statute of James, as
embracing lights.
Then comes Darwin v. Upton, in 1789, in which the question
came before all the judges of the King's Bench. The plaintiff,
upon no other title than twenty-five years' enjoyment, brought his
action for the obstruction of light, and he recovered before GOULD,
J., at Nisi Prius. The case came before the court in bane upon a
rule for a new trial for misdirection to the jury, by Justice GOULD.
It should, however, be observed that under the rule for a new trial
no question whatever was made in that case, as to the application
of the rule of twenty years' possession to the case of lights, but the
exception taken was that the judge had instructed the jury that
the lapse of time constituted an absolute bar not to be rebutted, the
defendant's counsel admitting that the twenty years' possession
raised a title, but as he insisted a presumptive title only, subject to
be explained away. The judges in bane, in. opinions *expressed
seriatim, held such to be the law, and upon explanation by the
justice who tried the case that such was the meaning of his instruction to the jury, the court discharged the rule. Says Lord
MANSFIELD, "the enjoyment of light with the defendant's acquiescence for twenty years, is such decisive presumption of a right by
grant or otherwise that unless contradicted or explained, the jury
ought to believe it." Though, he adds, not an absolute bar, "it
is certainly a presumptive bar which ought to go to a jury." I
have before said that Darwin v. Upton, though decided shortly
VOL. XXIV.--3
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after our independence, introduced no new rule as to lights, but
was declaratory that the law of presumptive title from twenty years'
possession, which had long before been applied to other incorporeal
rights, equally embraced this one of them. Now, this view is
clearly implied in the language of all the judges. For Lord MANSFIELD, and Justices WILLES and BULLER, cite prior instances of
the application of the rule to several kinds of easements as controlling the case of lights. And, besides, the possession on which
the plaintiff in Darwin v. Upton recovered, and which* consequently
was held to be under the operation of the rule of presumptive title,
commenced before 1776, as it was a possession of twenty-five years
prior to 1789 ; so that the recovery necessarily assumed the rule
to have been a part of the law prior to 1776. It need only be
added that Darwin v. Upton, as a case truly declaratory of the
common law then settled on this subject, has been recognised in
the later English cases, as by BULLER, J., in Read v. Brookman,
8 T. IR. 159, and by BAILEY, J., in Cross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C.
686. It is difficult indeed to see bow, in the face of such a judicial history, it can be doubted that at the period of our independence as a 3tate, what is termed the English doctrine of presumptive
title to light from twenty years' enjoyment, was a part of that
common law which as an entire body or system, the constitution
of 1776 was so careful to continue in force.
Secondly. We must now return to the constitutional provision
of 1776, and inquire whether by force of it, what we have seen to
be the common law doctrine of ancient lights at the date of the
constitution, became the law of this state. It cannot be overlooked that notwithstanding the broad language of the constitution, there were many parts of the common law of England, as it
stood prior to 1776, which never have in fact been regarded by
our courts as of force in this country: yet it is to be observed that
the courts have not herein acted arbitrarily in adopting some parts
of the common law and rejecting other parts, according to their
views of the policy of particular rules or doctrines. On the contrary, those parts of the common law of England, which have not
been here practically administered by the courts, will be found, on
examination, to reduce themselves to two classes, resting upon
grounds which render them proper to be treated as implied exceptions to the constitutional provision, in addition to the expressed
exception of such parts of the common law as "were repugnant
to the rights and privileges contained in the constitution." &c.
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One of these classes of exceptions may be briefly disposed of.
It embraces those parts of the rules and practice of the common
law which had become superseded by long-settled usages of trade
or business, or habits of dealing among our people, such as could
not be unsettled or disturbed without serious inconvenience or
injury. In such cases, upon the necessary maxim that communis
errorfacit jus, the courts accepted these departures as practical
modifications of the common law. Many illustrations of this class
might be given, such as the use of an ink scroll instead of wax
and paper to constitute a seal; and such is the explanation of our
long practice of allowing stays of execution without prejudice to the
lien of a levy upon goods, a practice unknown at common law.
Such instances are very numerous and need not be further referred
to. But on the subject before us, there has certainly during the
century which has almost elapsed since our independence, been no
known usage or custom, no general course of dealing or acting
among our people, nor any apparent understanding of the lair
inconsistent with the rule of a presumptive title by user to light
and air, as well as to other incorporeal rights, so that the enforcement now of such a rule would unsettle or disturb titles acquired
or supposed to be acquired upon the faith of a different state of
the law. On the contrary, the general rule of presumptive title
from twenty years' user of incorporeal rights by analogy to the
Statute of James I., of which the doctrine of ancient lights is but
one of the applications, has always been received and frequently
adjudged in our courts as part of that common law which was
adopted under the constitution of 1776. It so happens that no
case has arisen for the application by the courts to light and air,
of the general rule of prescriptive title, but it cannot be doubted
that so far as our people have acted in matters of title with any
view to the state of the law on this question, they must have
naturally presumed that the rule of analogy to the Statute of James
I., having been adopted from the common law and applied by the
courts to such cases of incorporeal rights as had arisen for judicial
decision, was adopted, not in some only of its applications at
common law, but as to all. And thus we see that it is by now
rejecting, and not by applying the doctrine of ancient lights, that
past transactions and titles heretofore acquired or supposed to be
acquired would be unsettled and prejudiced.
We pass then to the other class of rules which, though parts of
the common law of England, have never been administered by the
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courts under the constitution of 1776. This class embraces
those parts of the common law which in the terms usually employed were at the period of our independence inapplicable to the
existing circumstances and institutions of our people. This was a
well-understood limitation upon the extent to which the colonies
were considered to have carried .with them the laws of the mother
country (1 Black. Com. 108 ; 1 Story on Cons., sect. 148); and
without doubt the same limitation, though not expressed, attached
to the provision of the constitution of 1776. But this limitation
will not be found to touch the present subject. There is less difficulty in applying the limitation practically than in attempting to
define it. I understand it as excluding those parts of the common
law of England which were applicable to subjects connected with
political institutions and usages peculiar to the mother country,
and having no existence in the colonies, such, for example, as
offices, dignities, advowsons, tithes, &c.; also, as excluding some
of the more artificial rules of the common law, springing out of
the complicated system of police, revenue and trade, among a
great commercial people and not therefore applicable to the more
simple transactions of the colonies or of the states in their early
history: also it may be understood as excluding or modifying
many rules of what is known as the common law of practice and
possibly of evidence, which the greater simplicity in our system
for the administration of justice would render unnecessary or inconvenient.
But, on the other hand, our early legislative and judicial history
shows conclusively that what may be termed the common law of
property was received as an entire system, subject to alterations
by the legislature only. Rights of property and of persons are
fundamental rights necessary to be defined and protedted in every
civil society. The common law, as a system framed to this very
end, could not be deemed inapplicable in the colonies for want of a
subject-matter, or as being needless or superfluous or unacceptable,
which is the true sense of the limitation in question. Certain it
is, as a matter of history, that our ancestors did riot so treat it.
Perhaps no branch of the common law was adopted in this state so
entire as this law of real estate, the whole body of which, with all
its rules for defining the nature and quantity of estates in lands,
for prescribing the modes of acquiring title to them, and for regulating their transmission was, from the beginning, administered by
our courts substantially as in England, with such modifications
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only as were made from time to time by the legislature. And as
a part of the common law of real estate the rule of presumptive
title to incorporeal rights from twenty years' user, by analogy to
the statute limiting entries into lands, has been received as the
law of this state from the beginning, and frequently applied to
other kinds of incorporeal rights, no case of lights before this one
having arisen. Now, it was doubtless true that the common law,
in the very parts adopted and taking force, would in many of its
special features and rules require alteration and amendment upon
considerations of policy, either existing at the time of independence
or to be developed in the future. But the framers of the constitution of 1776, wisely appreciating the necessity of carrying into
their new political condition some matured and completed system
of jurisprudence for defining and protecting rights of property, as
well as civil rights at large, chose to adopt as such a system, the
body of !he common law as it then stood, giving immediate and
full force in all their rules to those branches of the common law
which, as a whole, were applicable and necessary, such as was the
law of real estate. And taking into consideration this very necessity of future alterations and adjustments in particular features, the framers of the constitution of 1776 provided for it by
devolving the power to make such alterations upon the legislature.
Then following this action of the framers of the constitution, in
exact accordance with the terms of this provision, as well as with
the true and universally admitted, though not always strictly observed, line of separation, between legislative and judicial power,
has been the uniform practice, both of our courts and our legislatures. It is well known that much of the English law of real
estate, such as the rules of inheritance, and the system of entails,
were out of harmony with the genius of our people; yet these,
and all other features of the common law of property, found to be
inexpedient or unacceptable, were, both before and after the Revolution, excluded or modified by the legislature only, never by the
courts. It cannot be found that a single rule of property, well
settled as a part of the common law of England prior to the
Revolution, was ever excluded from our jurisprudence by judicial
decision only, although many of these rules rested originally upon
reasons which had no existence in this country, and were for our
people needlessly artificial; such, for a single example, as the rule
in Shelley's Case. On the whole, it must be clear, from uniform
judicial and legislative practice, that the inexpediency or inutility
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of certain rules of the common law, forming parts of an entire
system or branch, such as the law of real estate, (lid not render
those rules subject to be judicially eliminated from the system in
which they were incorporated, and then declared inapplicable to
the circumstances of this country, in the sense of the implied
limitation we have been considering. This was never done by the'
caurts, even as to rules of property plainly inexpedient under the i
circumstances of the country existing at the time of independence ;'
d fortiori would it be inadmissible upon considerations of policy
developed in the subsequent growth or progress of the country,
which, as we shall presently see, is the chief objection taken to
the English doctrine of ancient lights.
It is a noticeable fact that the English doctrine was recognised
without question as part of the common law by the early judges
of the state and of this country-judges certainly more likely
than later ones to receive correct impressions of the stmtte of our
common law as originally derived from the mother country. No
early adjudged cases directly upon the point are found, but the
incidental expressions of opinion in the courts, sufficiently indicated the general direction of judicial and professional opinion, as
in favor of the doctrine ; and this, though not authority, is evidence of no small weight that as a matter of judicial history the
English rule was, at the period of our independence, regarded as
part of the common law, and was not tlen inapplicable to the circumstances of the colonies. The first expressions of opinion in
New York were decidedly that way: .Afahan v. Brown, 13 Wend.
261 (1835); Banks v. American Tract Society, 4 Sandf. Ch.
438. In Massachusetts the early tendency of judicial opinion was
in that direction, and a statute was passed in 1852, expressly exeluding the English rule: DEwEY, J., in Atkins v. Mlson, et
al., 7 Mete. 408 (1846); C. J. SHAW, in Fifty Associates v.
Tudor, 6 Gray 259 (1856). So, in Maryland, DORSEY, J., in
Chny v. Stein, 5 11. & J. 477. So, in South Carolina, where in
1838, in MeReady v. Thompson, Dudley 131, upon very full
consideration the court held and applied the English doctrine as
to lights. In New Jersey, and in Illinois also, there have been
direct decisions holding the English rule in force: Robeson v.
-Pittenger,1 Greene Ch. 57; Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217. It
was not until the year 1838, in the case of Parker v. Foote, 19
Wend. 318, that any dissatisfaction with the rule appears. That
case in New York was followed in 'Maine by Pierre v. Fernald,
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26 Me. 436 (1847); in South Carolina, by Napier v. Byhwinkle,
5 Rich. 99 (1852); in Maryland, by (Cteny v. Stein, 11 Md. 1
(1858); and in Massachusetts, by Bogers v. Sawin, 10 Gray 376
(1858); and tarrig v. Dee, 14 Gray 583 (1860).
The objections to the doctrine taken by these cases are two:
one is that the enjoyment of light and air in a tenement received
over adjoining land is not an invasion of the possession of the servient owner for which he could maintain an action, and therefore
is not such an adverse user as to raise against him the presumption
of a grant. This objection assumes that under the true principle
of prescriptive title, the presumption of a grant arises only upon
the omission of the servient owner to take a legal remedy against
the easement or servitude exercised. Some learned judges have
gone so far as to speak of the doctrine as "an anomaly in the law,"
19 Wend. 318. But an examination of the history of the law of presumptive title from immemorial user would show that the presumption of a grant rests on a broader ground than the one stated, that
is, on the long-continued acquiescence of a servient owner, not
alone as evidenced by his waiver of a right of action, but as well by
his waiver of the unquestioned right to obstruct the privilege, so
far as exercised over his land. The other objection, and the controlling one, which has given to this course of decisions their direction, stated in the language of the cases, is, that the English doctrine as to lights "cannot be applied in the growing cities and
villages of this country without working the most mischievous consequences :" Parkerv. Foote, 19 Wend. 318. It will be observed
that the first objection challenges the original technical propriety
of the rule; apd if tenable would support the conclusion that the
doctrine of presumptive title was in the beginning erroneously
applied at common law ,to the case of light and air. The latter
objection rests upon considerations of public policy growing out of
a state of the country developed since the independence of the
colonies. Now, giving to both these objections the utmost force,
they still fail to meet my difficulty, which is that the doctrine of
ancient lights being, in point of fact, a rule of the English common
law of real estate at and prior to 1776, whether upon good teclinical grounds or not is immaterial, and having by force of the constitution of that year become a part of our common law of real
estate, it can be altered only by the legislature. Meanwhile the
courts must administer the rule as part of the common law.adopted
in the constitution of 1776, without inquiring whether, on the one
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hand, it was improperly or erroneously incorporated into the law
in the first instance, or whether, on the other hand, under the increase of population and the rapid growth of our cities and towns
since 1776, the rule is now found to work inconveniently or mischievously.
A few words -in conclusion upon a point that has frequently
pressed itself into my reflections upon this case; that is, the danger
of drawing too strictly and narrowly against the courts the limitation between the judicial and the legislative authority to change or
modify rules of the common law. It is, of course, true that any
system of jurisprudence, in order to meet the wants of society, more
especially the common law, which less than any other is codified,
must have a progressive development, expansion and improvement,
and new adaptations to changes in the condition of society and to
newly-arising interests while becoming subjects of legal protection
and this slow and silent growth has been, and, of necessity, must
be in part and to a large extent the work of the courts. Many
and important modifications in the common law, both in its principles and remedies, have gradually and imperceptibly grown up,
based upon .what is termed a course of judicial decisions. There is
one large field within which this moulding influence of the courts
may be legitimately and usefully exercised. It embraces what may
be termed the administration of the common law, its process, remedies, rules of practice, and of evidence. In all that concerns these
it is difficult to see why the courts should feel themselves restricted
in modifying and re-adapting them in details, from time to time, as
experience or changes in the condition of society may render obviously expedient. For those who administer the system, and are
personally cognisant of the operation of its rules and modes of
procedure, can better comprehend the necessity and precise extent
of any changes or re-adaptations which may be required, and the
best methods of effecting them. And certainly, the conservative
temper, so characteristic always of the judicial mind, renders it a
safe depository of such a power. There is another department of
the common law in the growth of which the influence of judicial
decisions has been largely felt. This embraces all that body of
rules and principles which regulate the transactions of trade and
business. No precipitate, sudden or radical change in these has
been ever made except by acts of legislation ; such, for example,
as was the Statute of Anne, giving negotiability to promissory notes;
but upon this statute there has been built up, mainly by the slow
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course of judicial decisions, the whole body of the law merchant.
All this is an unavoidable and legitimate exercise of the judicial
function. ]But there is one branch of the common law in which the
courts have scrupulously and wisely refrained from any judicial
changes. That embraces all those rules and principles which directly concern what may bb called the fundamental social rights,
rights of person and of property, especially the latter. The rules
which define and protect these, operate directly upon the people
whose experience under such rules is the best test of the expediency of changes in them. Hence, for such changes, legislative
action only is appropriate and safe, and on such changes the
courts do not venture.
With respect to the law of property there is an additional and
very important reason for this caution, i. e., that judicial decisions,
in theory at least, are supposed not to alter but simply to declare
and administer the law; so that a decision, or a course of decisions,
which in effect should change or modify a rule of property by
declaring it otherwise than it has before been understood to be,
operates retrospectively, affecting not only future titles, but also
titles before acquired and transactions entered into in reliance upon
a different state of the law. So great a mischief is the unsettling of
confidence in titles held to be, that rather than incur the hazard of
it the courts have not unfrequently refrained from declaring, as a
rule of property, what would have been well founded upon legal
principles applicable to the subject-matter, solely because it was apprehended that titles were resting upon a generally-accepted different state of the law. A striking example, among many, of this caution is found in the English decisions, which continued to deny dower
to the widow, out of an equitable estate of her deceased husband,
long after those estates had been subjected in equity to all the incidents of legal estates, even to the curtesy of a surviving husband.
The allowance of curtesy and the denial of dower out of estates of
precisely the same nature was felt to be anomalous and an unreasonable discrimination against the wife. This is acknowledged by so
great a judge as Lord IIrEDESDALE, in D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 S. & L. 388.
"Courts of equity," he says, "had assumed as a principle in acting
upon trusts to follow the law; and according to this principle they
ought in all cases where rights attached on legal estates to have
attached the same rights upon trusts, and consequently to have given
dower of an equitable estate. It was found, however, that in cases
of (lower this principle, if pursued to the utmost, would affect the
VOL. XXIV.-4
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titles to a large proportion of the estates of the country ; for that
parties had beeni acting on the footing of dower upon a contrary
,principle, and had supposed that by the creation of a trust the right
of dower would be prevented from attaching. Many persons had
purchased under this idea. * * * But the same objection did
liot apply to tenancy by the curtesy; for no person would purchase an estate subjcct to tenancy by the curtesy without the
concurrence of the person in whom the right was vested. This I
take to be the true reason of the distinction between dower and tenancy by the curtesy. It was necessary for the security of purchasers, of mortgagees, and of other persons taking the legal etates, to
depart from the general principle in case of dower; but it was not
necessary in the case of tenancy by the curtesy." And so dower,
out of equitable estates, continued to be denied, until finally this
anomlaly in the law was corrected by the Statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4,
ell. 105.
Now, to apply this conservative rule of judicial action to the
present case, how can it be doubted that during the long interval
after the adoption of our state constitution in 1776, until at least
the year 1888, when the doctrine of ancient lights as part of the
common law*of this country was first drawn into question, it must
have been practically recognised as the law of this state in alny
transaction depemding upon the question ; and that it would have
been so adjudged had any case arisen for its judicial applicationi ?
And can there be doubt that at this day there may exist in this
state, rights materially affecting the value and enjoyment of property supposed to have been acquired under the common law of
ancient lights, since, as yet, no contrary rule has been declarel
by our courts or could reasonably have been inferred to exist?
Certainly it is wise not now to risk the unsettling of such interests
by judicially declaring the rule to be what until recently neither
our courts, nor the bar, nor the people concerned, could with reason
have supposed it to be; on the other hand, a legislative alteration
of the law will serve all the considerations of policy which lave
been urged against continuing the doctrine of ancient lights, and
yet by operating, as it would, prospectively, will leave undisturbed
any interests wlich may have grown up under a reasonable belief
that the old law was still in force.
The English doctrine referred to in
the principal cne. has been variously
received in the different states of this

country. In a majority of -those in
which the question has arisen, it has
been held that no such doctrine forms a
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part of the law of that particular state.
The reasons for not following the English rule have been various, but that
usually assigned has been the inapplicability of the rule to the circumstances
of a new and rapidly growing community. Where so many vacant lots must
attend for years the progress of municipal improvements, it was considered
wrong to import a presumption of foreign
growth, and which is inapplicable to
our circumstances, and to declare in the
first cases which called for its application that it was a part of ourlaw. Some
judges have denied that the Statute of
James (21 James I.), and its application by analogy to easements, was ever
in force in their state, but it is believed
that most of the courts who have refused
to adopt " the modern English doctrine
of ancient lights," have rested their decisions upon the ground of inapplicability above stated.
"In 11'ardv. zYeal, 37 Ala. 500 (1861),
it was held that the English doctrine did
not prevail in that state. In Ray v.
Lynes, 10 Ala. 63 (1846), the point
was not raised, as the privation of light
and air was not averred to be material,
and the privilege had not been enjoyed
for such a length of time that acquiescence could be presumed. It is perhaps
implied in that case that when the point
arose the English rule would be followed, but the question was not discassed, and Mr. Washburn is therefore
wrong in referring to this case as one in
which the English doctrine was followed: Washburn's Easements and Servitudes, 3d ed., p. 622,
27. He is
equally incorrect in referring to Gerber
v. Grabel, 16 Il1. 217 (la54), and Darel v. Boisblanc, 1 Louisiana Ann. 407
(1846), as sustaining the English rule.
In the first of these cases, in an action
on the case for the obstruction of lights,
the jury found for the plaintiff, the court
arrested the judgment and entered it
for the defendant. The two grounds
urged by the defendant were (1) that

the declaration did not prescribe for
ancicnt lights, but merely. averred possession and the right to enjoy; (2) that
the doctrine of ancient lights did not
prevail in Illinois. Two of the three
members of the Supreme Court (SC ATES
and CATO.i) reversed the court below
and remanded the case for judgment on
the verdict.
ScATES, J., said, that the English
rule was not in force in Illinois, because
the Statute of 21 James I. had not been
adopted in Illinois (only those statutes
in aid of the common law prior to 4
James I. have been adopted in that
state), and as the doctrine of the presumption of grant from adverse user of
light and air for twenty years, could not
be traced back to a period beyond 21
James I., it could not be said that the
modern English doctrine was in force.
After quoting the older English eases,
the judge said: "While we highly respect the learned decisions of English
courts adopting an analogous rule to
their Statute of Limitations, we must
bow to the authority of these older rulings, with liberty to say that a twenty
years' prescription for the easement of
light and air is not applicable to the
circumstances of this state, unsettled
and unimproved as it is." The difference is there pointed out between easements, the use of which requires physical possession and occupation, and is
therefore adverse, and easements the enjoyment of which is lawful and does not
invade the rights of others, as is the
case in easements of light and air.
" Under these circumstances, the presumption has a sensible basis to operate
upon in the forbearance of the injured
party to vindicate his rights by entry
or action, and his acquiescence in the
known claim and appropriation of his
rights, by another. ** * But no part
of his reasoning will apply to an incorporeal servitude of light and air. * * *
There is no wrong to complain of, or
injury to redress, as in the class of
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casements referred to. It cannot, thereThe windows of the house on one of
fore, become an easement or servitude
these lots opened oi a passage-way on
upon the land until it begins to operate
tile
other lot, which separated the two
upon the owner's right of obstructing
houses ; and to the yard of this house
the light and air.
When then does this
there was no access except by this passeri'tude beyio ? At the precise period,
sage-way. It was held that as the serwhen mlan's memory of its adoption is
vitudes of way and light were apparent
lost. Such was the common law of our
and necessary for the latter house, and
adopion, and its adoption is as well
were not concealed from the purchaser
suited, in all things to us, as to any
of the adjoining property, the latter was
people or country."
The judge went not entitled to rescind his purchase, and
on to say, however, that as it seemed
his lot was subject to the above-name.1
that tile
judgment in arrest must have
easement-3. See Laiillebenve v. Cosgroere, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858).
been predicated upon the insufficiney
In Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436,
of the declaration itnnot averring the
lights to be ancient, and as the court
the plaintiff's
premisds, as well as those
was of opinion that tileplaintiff might
overlooked by his windows, had been in
have proved a prescriptive right under
his possession during a portion of the
twenty years preceding the cause of
the common law of Illinois, or allexaction, the plaintiff having hired the
press grant. or circumstances from which
a grant or estoIpel might be presumed,
adjoining premises from the owner of
them. It was held that, whether the
it was to he presumed in the absence of
English rule prevailed or not, tile
plainevidence, that tile
verdict was warranted.
tiftf could not recover for the obstruction
CArO', J., came to the same conclusion,
of his windows, for there could be no
but thought that the English rule formed
part of tilecommon law which was
presumption of an adverse use by him
of the light and air passing over premadopted in Illinois, and that rule was
binding on the court, even though the
ises adjoining his own, while the latter
were in his possession. The English
puhlic good wouhl be promoted by its
rule is, it is true, declared inapplicable
repeal. TiREAT, C. J., dissented, on
to this country, but the decision rests on
what ground is not stated. It will he
the ground stated.
seen then that what was decided in this
In 1',rig
ease was that the declaration was suffi9 bt v. Freeman, 5 Il.& J.
(Md.) 467 (1823), l)onsay, J., said:
clent; that two judges differed as to the
1 So the enjoyment of lights for twenty
condition of the law in Illinois, in regard to ancient lights, while the third years, with the acquiescence of the
owner of the fee of the adjoining ground,
judge thought that judgment was prois such a decisive presumption of a right
perly entered for the derendant, his
by grant or otherwise, unless contrareason necessarily being that the decladicted or explained, that the jury ought
ration was defective, for the evidence
to believe it." But in Cherry v. Stein,
was not brought up by the record, and
11 Md. 1 (1857), the contrary was dethere is nothing in the report of the
cided. One of the questions in that
ease to show that the plaintiff founded
case was whether the English rule was
his right upon the existence in Illinois
the law of Maryland. ECCLESTON, J.,
of the English doctrine of ancient lights.
said: "We do not consider as appliIn Duri v. Boisblanc, supra, the quescable to the cities and villages in this
tion under discussion did not arise at all.
state such a right to lights by twenty
In that ease, two adjoining lots, with
years' user of them as in some of the
houses erected on them, were sold by
American cases has been called 'the
the same owner to different persons.
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modem English doctrine.'"
The case
of Sinitk v. lM~ite, decided by the Baltimore County Court, is referred to as
taking the same view.
In &ory v. Odin, 12 Mass. 157
(1815), JACKSON, J., said that the
plaintiff might have proved that the
house was an ancient one, or that he
was entitled by prescription to the easement of light, though those facts were
not set forth in the declaration. But
the question as to the prevalence in
Massachusetts of the English rule was
not raised. In Atkins v. Chilson, 7 let.
398 (1844), DEWEY, J, referring to
the question, said: "The tendency of
our (Massachusetts) decisions has been
the other way," (from those of New
York), i. e., in accordance with the
English rule. The point was not decided. So in Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Mlet.
395 (1845), StHAw, C. J., said, "Ithis
was a modem house, andhad acquired no
rights of light and air for the staircasewindow over D.'s land;" and in PQfei
Associates v. Tudor, 6 Gray 255 (1856),
the same judge commented upon the discrepancy of the decisions on this subject,
and declined to decide the point.
But in Rogers v. Sawin, 10 Gray 376
(1858), the court receded from the view
heretofore expressed, and decided that
the English rule was not in force. After
stating the law of England, METCALF,
J., said: "Is this the common law of
Massachusetts? We think not. ** *
The short grounds of the decisions cited
are, (I) that the making of a window in
one's building, on his own land, and
overlooking the land of his neighbor,
is no encroachment on his neighbor's
rights, and therefore cannot be regarded
as adverse to him ; (2) that the English
doctrine is not applicable to the state of
things in this country, and would, if
applied, work mischievous consequences
in our cities and villages." This was
followed in Carrigv. Dee, 14 Gray 583
(1860).
In that case it was held that
no easement of light and air was ac-

quired by their free passage for more
than twenty years prior to the statute
of 1852, to the window of a house resting on the boundary line, although the
shutters of the windows swung on their
hinges over the adjoining land. SirAw,
C. J., said the court are of opinion that
the window on hinges swinging outward over defendant's land did not
constitute such an adverse possessory
use of the adjoining land as to make
any difference in the principle. In
Richardsoav. Pond, 15 Gray 387 (1860),
it was again held that twenty years' use
of light and air, coming over adjoining
property, raised no presumption of title
t
to the easement.
In New Jersey, as well as in Delaware, the English rule has been followed,
and those states are, we believe, .the
only ones in which the question has
been directly decided in that way. In
Robeson v. M3faxwell 4- Pittenger, 1 Green
Ch. 57 (1838), a motion to dissolve an
injunction against the obstruction of
lights which had overlooked the adjoining premises for more than twenty years
was refused. The complainants were
the owners of a lot and dwelling-house
erected thereon in 1802 by the former
owner of that lot and the one adjoining,
which was overlooked by the windows
of the dwelling. In 1806 the owner
died intestate, and the lots and dwellinghouse descended to his children, who
remained seised as tenants in common
until 1828, when two of the heirs conveyed the vacant lot to the third heir.
It passed by several conveyances to the
defendant, who, in 1838, began laying
the foundation of a house which would
immediately adjoin the dwelling-house
above mentioned, and obstruct its windows. This latter lot and the house
on it had remained in the possession of
the heirs of the original owner till
1829, when it was sold by them and
passed to the plaintiff. It will thus be
seen that the two adjoining lots were
uninterruptedly in the possession of the
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same owners from the time of the erec-

York.

tion of the building on one lot till

applicable to this country; BaoNsov,
J., sayig " as neither light, air nor
prospect can be the subject of a grant,
the proper presumption, if any, to be
made in this case, is, that there was
some covenant or agreement not to obstruct the lights. * * * In the case of
windows overlooking the land of another,
the injury, if any, is merely ideal or imaginary. The light and air which they
admit are not the subjects of property,
beyond the moment of actual occupancy,
and for overlooking one's privacy no
action can be maintained. The party has
no remedy but to build on the adjoining
land opposite the offensive window.
* * * In the case of lights there is no
adverse user, nor inleed any use whpfever of another's property, and no
foundation is laid for indulging any presumption against the rightful owner.
* *
What is the acquiescence which
concludes the owner 7
No one has
trespassed upon his land, or (lone him a
legal injury of any kind. Ile has submitted to nothing but the exercise of a
lawful right on the part of his neigh.:
bor. How then has he forfeited the
beneficial interest in his property * * *
There is, I think, no principle upon
which the modern English doctrine on
the subject of lights can be supported. It
is an anomaly in the law. It may do
well enough in England. * * * But it
cannot be applied in the growing cities
and villages of this country, without
working the most mischievous consequences. It has never I think been
deemed a part of our law." - NELSON,
C. J., concurred ; CowE.., J., dissented.
In Baks v. Anz. Tract Soc., 4 Sandf.
Ch.438 (1847), a decision as towhether
the English doctrine prevailed was studiously avoided, though the point was
before the court. In Myers v. Gemmel,
10 Barb. 537 (1851), til owner of
two adjoining lots, on one of which was
a building with windows opening on the
vacant lot, leased the lot with the house

1828. Unless, therefore, the adverse use
by the windows of ti house built on one
lot of the light and air passing over the
other began ten years before tile ownership of either of the lots passed out
of the common owner, the doctrine
which we have been discussing is wholly
inapplicable, and the Chancellor (]'Ei.Nixoro.) is clearly wrong in deciding
the case as he does upon a principle
which, whether correct or not, can have
no bearing upon the particular case.
Throughout the decision the distinction
referred to is wholly overlooked, and
premising that the case is one of adverse
user of light and air for more than
twenty years, the Chancellor founds his
reasoning upon and applies his illustra-.
tions to the particuhir facts which are
not those of the case before him.
In Mahan v. Brown. 13 Wend. 261

(1835),

SAVAGE,

C. J., said: " It is

perfectly settled that as the occupant
may acquire a right to the house itself
by twenty years' uninterrupted possession under claim of title, so in the same
time he shall by occupation acquire a
right to an easement belonging to the
house. * * * The person who thus
opens a window overlooking the privacy
of his neighbor, enjoys an casement In
that which does not belong to him.
Yet no action lies for this encroachment
upon the rights of the person whose
lands are thus overlooked, the encroachment will in twenty years ripen into a
right, and it is said that the only remedy
is to build on the adjoining land opposite to the offensive window."
In this
case the lights had not been enjoyed
during twenty years, and a motion to
set aside the nonsuit which had been
entered was denied.
In Parker v. F6Ote, 19 Wend. 309
(1838), in the same year in which the
question had been decided in New
Jersey in favor of the English doctrine,
the opposite view was taken in New

The English rule was held in-
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on it to another for years, without reserving any rights to himself. Held, that
the doctrine of ancient lights did not
apply in this country, and that to build
a house on the vacant lot adjoining, not
being in derogation of his grant, could
not be enjoined against. ED.%oXZs, P.
J., dissented.
" Only such parts of the common
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and considerations, and both should
stand or fall together. They are unsuited to a country like ours, where
real estate is constantly and rapidly appreciating, and being subjected to new
and more costly forms of improvement,
and where it so frequently changes
owners as almost to become a matter of
merchandise. * * * It will be safer and
law," says MITCHELL, J., "were
more likely to subserve the ends of jusbrought by the colonists with them as tice and public good to leave the parties,
suited their condition. * * * A law
on question of light and air, to the bouninapplicable to the condition of the dary lines they name, and the terms
country for so long a period could not they express in their deeds and conbelong to that part of the common law tracts." Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Penn.
which we brought with us, namely, so
St. 368, quoted and approved.
much only as was applicable to our
In .fcCready v. Thomson, Dudley (S.
condition, nor as part of the law of the C.) 131 (1838), the verdict was for the
colony on 19th April 177I. * * * It is
plaintiff in an action on the case for
against the spirit of our people to en- obstructing lights during fifty-five years.
cumber their lands with privileges in A motion for a new trial was dismissed,
favor of other, though adjoining lands, O'NEALL, J., saying : " The common
law is very clear that one may prescribe
whether held by them or others. * * *
In such a community it would be doing for air and light as .welI as for any other
violence to the habits and customs of the easement.
'rescription presumes a
people to presume a grant or intention grant. The use of the easement for
to grant a right to another over adjoin- twenty years and upwards, is only the
ing property not within the limits shown evidence of it. * * * But [it has beeni
on the face of the grant, or not unques- insisted that the rule was an unwise
tionably indicated by the use and situa- one, and inapplicable to this country.
The first argument may very properly
tion of the property."
In 3Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. be addressed to legislators ; with judges,
135 (1869), the question was not raised, however, it can have no weight. The
but WELCH, J., expressed his disap- law, as we find it, and not-as we would
proval of the English doctrine. "We
have it, is to be our guide. The other
understand the law to be in Ohio that argument can have as little force ; the
no prescriptive right to the use of light common law is the lav of South Caroand air through windows can be ac- lina, as much as it is of England. * * *
quired by any length of use or enjoy- There is nothing in the principle now
ment. * * * It seems to us that the under consideration, which renders it
doctrine of easements in light and air, unsuitable to our political or civil infounded upon sheer necessity and con- stitutions. It is a mere private right,
venience, like the kindred doctrine of originating in consent, and perfected by
ancient windows or prescriptive right to lapse of time, contributing to the comlight and air by long user, is wholly fort and value of a person's habitation.
unsuited to our condition, and is not in But in Xapier v. 3,dvinkle, 5 Rich.
accordance with the common under- (S. C.) 311 (1852), the opposite view
standing of the community. Both doc- was taken.
WARDLA-W, J.. said:
trines are based upon similar reasons " Where no other evidence of assent is
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given, the fair inference from unob- is an encumbrance." In )larerstick
structed enjoyment of such a window is, v. Sipe, 33 Penna. St. 368 (1859),
that there was acquiescence in a favor, Low RuEt C. J., said: "It has never
but not in a right ; that the obstruction been considered, in this state, that a
was forborne, not because alleasement contract for the privilege of light and
had been granted or the acquisition of
air over another man's ground could be
one thought of, but because, to tile implied from the fact that such a priviowner of the space, it was immaterial
lege has been long enjoyed : or that, on
to what use another might turn the elea sale of a house and lot, such a conments that had passed through his space
tract could be implied from the charand served his purpose. * * * Where acter of the improvements on the lot
nothing besides the unobstructed enjoysold and the adjoining lots. How can
ment appears to sustain the right, he
we define an easement for light and air
who complains of his window being
by implication, without arresting all
darkened by the alterations of his neighchange in the style of buildings, all
bor's property, may well be told that
enlargement of a man's house according
these lie should have anticipated."
to the demands of a growing or imIn Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts (Pa.)
327 (1834), it was said by RoGERs, J.,
"The doctrine of the English books in
respect to ancient lights is not very well
understood in this country. I am not
aware that any case has been ruled in
this state in which the principle has been
recognised. It should be introduced
with caution. "Mnyvacant lots in our
cities and towns are owned by persons
who reside at a distance, ail who are
either unable or unwilling to improve
them. It would be most inconvenient
to compel them to do so, on the penalty
of forfeiting a valuable right by neglect."
In Maynard v. Esher, 17 Penna. St.
222 (1851), it is said by LowtiE , C.
J., ,"Where a man, owning a lot
partly covered by a house with windows opening out upon the other part,
sells the part on which the house stands,
then the purchaser acquires a right to
have light and air from the adjoining
part, so that the vendor will be restricted in building upon it. * * *
Where both lots are passing out of tle
vendor at the same instant, it is impossible to imply that lie is making one
servient to the other ; and this is especially so when lie is selling both lots
clear of encumbrances, for an easement

proving family? * * * The advantage

which one man derives by obtaining
light and air over the ground of another,
is no adverse privilege, as it ordinarily
appears ; for it is no sort of encroachment on the land of another, or interference with his enjoyment of it, and he
could not without churlishness protest
against it when used with neighborly
propriety. The enjoyment of such a
privilege needs no implication of a
grant to account for it, and none is
made."
In Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295
(1860), it was held that the English
rule did not apply in Vermont. The
ground of the decision was that a grant,
waiver or abandonment, cannot be presumed against one who is unable to
preserve .the thing unlawfully used by
an action against the trespasser. An
action will not lie against one whose
windows overlook my land; it cannot
therefore be presumed by mere lapse of
time in such a case that I have deprived
myself of a right to close those windows in the only lawful way, viz.: by
building against them.
In Morrison v. Marquardt, 7 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 336; s. c. 24 Iowa
35 (1867),

DILLONW, C. J., says: * *

"1'crhaps the law as to implied ease-
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ments generally cannot be said to be that in cases of doubt the words of a
fully settled, and this is particularly
grant are to be interpreted against the
true in this country as to easements of grantor. This principle, in its applicalight and air. The right to light and tion to the subject of which we are treatair seems in many respects to be differ- ing, is illustrated by the case of the
ent in its nature from easements relating
United States v. Samud Appleton, 1
to artificial erections on the servient
Sumn. 492. In 1808 a block of buildestate, such as drains, gutters, pipes, ings was built, consisting of a centre
&c., or rights of way and the like.
building with wings.
There was a
"As to light and air, I am free'to say piazza in front of the centre building,
that I do not believe the rule, as ap- over which swung doors in the wings.
plied to our situation and circumstances,
In 1811 the wings were sold to the dea sound one, which holds that under fendants, and the centre building was
any circumstances this right can ly im- sold in 1816 to the United States, who
plication be burdened upon an adjoining had occupied it under a lease from 1808
estate, as to prevent the owner thereof
to that time. Held, that the defendants
from building upon or improving it as he were under the terms of the grant enpleases. I would reverse the rule and
titled to the use of the side-doors as
hold that he who claims that the ten
used at the time of the conveyance,
* * * feet adjoining him * * * shall
independently of the lapse of time.
remain vacant and unimproved, should The language of the conveyance was,
found such claim upon an express grant
"the above [wing] with all the privior covenant.
leges and appurtenances." STORY, J. :
"This rule is simple. Grantor and
" The law gives a reasonable intendgrantee would both know that the deed ment in all such cases to the grant ; and
is the measure of their rights. Is it passes with the property all those easeany hardship upon the purchaser to ments and privileges, which at the time
secure by express grant, lights so valu- belong to it, and are in use as appurable to him and so detrimental to his tenances. * * * A man sells a dwellgrantor,-rights which, unless limited ing-house with windows then looking
and defined by written stipulations, are into his own adjacent lands. There
of uncertain extent and uncertain du- can be no doubt that the grant carries
ration ? * * * A denial of an easement with it the right to the enjoyment of the
of mere implication, as respects light light to those windows; and that the
and air, may, in my judgment, well
grantor cannot, by building on his adbe, without denying that other easements jacent land, entitle himself to obstruct
of a different character may, and in the light, or close up the windows.
some cases should, be held to exist by * * * In truth, every grant of a thing
implication." [The point was not, how- naturally and inecessarily imports a
ever, decided, since it was held the cir- grant of it, as it actually exists, unless
cumstances negatived conclusively the the contrary is provided for."
presumption of the implied easement.]
SYDNEY BIDDLE.
It is a well-known principle of law

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
ISAAC STROUSE v. HENRY N. WHITTLESEY,

JR.

The defendant was driving through a city street in the evening, on the right
hand side of the street, at a moderate speed, and in passing a team standing on the
same side of the road was compelled to turn into the middle of the street, and in
yoL. XXIV.-5
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so doing necessarily occupied about two and a half feet of the left hand side of the
street. In thus passing around the standing team he came into collision with the
plaintiff's vehicle which was coming towards him. There was ample room for
both teams, but neither driver discovered the otherltill the moment of collision, and
both the plaintiff and defendant were using ordinary care. Held, that the defendant was not liable for the damage.
Such a case is one merely of misfortune and accident, where each party must
sustain tie damage which happens to befall him.
TRESPASS ON THE CASE, for an injury by the negligent driving
of the defendant ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New

Haven county. Facts found and case reserved for advice.
case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The

Driscoll and Aslcr, for the plaintiff.
TV'ight and H. L. farrison,for the defendant.
PHELPS, J.-The record in this case presents a very clear case
of injury without proof of such negligence as renders the defendant legally responsible. The plaintiff and defendant were passing
in opposite directions through Orange street, in the city of New
Haven in the evening, both driving at moderate speed, and in the
exercise of such care as is ordinarily observed by drivers, and each
on the proper side of the street. The street is twenty-six-feet wide
at the place of contact. or that space eight feet on the side the
defendant was driving was occupied by a standing team. He turned
into the middle of the street only so far as was reasonably necessary to pass the standing wagon, and in so doing occupied'two feet
and four inches beyond the centre line of the street. He did not
discover the plaintiff's vehicle until the instant of the collision.
The plaintiff had the remainder of the street, ten feet and eight
inches, which was double the room which he actually required.
Each party followed the rule which required him to keep to the
right hand side of the way, and but for the standing team no collision would have occurred. The defendant had a right to pass that
team, and if necessary for that purpose, to cross the centre line of
the street, provided he observed proper care in doing so, and saw
that sufficient room was reserved for any team to pass in safety
which might be coming from the opposite direction. He appears
from the finding to have done his duty in this respect, and the facts
disclose a case of misfortune and accident, without negligence or
fault, in which the parties must respectively sustain the damage
which happened to befall them.
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We advise the Court of Common Pleas to render judgment for
the defendant.
We publish the foregoing case because
it covers, anl, as we think, correctly
decides an important questi 6 n of law ;
one that occurs almost hourly in some
portion of our widely -extended country.
And there seems to be some kind of impression among the profession, both here
and in England, that one may become
liable to an action of trespass for direct
injury to another, either by falling accidentally upon him, or having his
horses or team rush upon him, in the
street, even where he is guilty of no
negligence. We infer the existence of
this impression, as we have just stated,
from the continued institution of actions
of this character, as will be sufficiently
apparent from the principal case, and
the recent case of Holmes and ile v.
Mather, in the Court of Exchequer,
June 24th 1875, 23 W. R. 869, where
,he question is very learnedly discussed
both by the court and bar. After discussing the matter at some length,
BRAMWELL, B., reaches the conclusion
that when the damage is inflicted by
direct force, and the defendant had no
purpose of doing the act, and was guilty
of no negligence, no action will lie.
In this case the defendant was in tile
carriage with his driver, and "the
horses were startled by a dog, and, without any fault of the defendant or the
groom, became unmanageable and ran
away down the street. The groom requested the defendant to sit still and not
to interfere in any way. On reaching
the end of the street, where it was
crossed by another, the horses swerved
to the right, and were in danger of running into a shop window; the driver
thereupon attempted to turn them still
more to the right, in order to make
them go down the cross street," which
would have avoided the accident; but
only partially succeeding, they- ran
against "the female plaintiff and eaued
her serious injury." A majority of the

court considered the act of the groom to
be that of the defendant, as he was
present and made no dissent. CLEASny,B., said: "The act of the groom in
guiding the horses was not the act or
the defendant ;" but all agreed, as there
was no wrong intent and no negligence
or want of proper and judicious effort
to escape doing the injury, or any injury to any one, there could be no recovery.

Baron BRAMWE LL, than whom

no living judge is more expert in hitting
the exact point of all cases before him,
said : " For the convenience of mankind, in carrying on the affairs of life,
people, as they go along roads, must
expect and put up with such mischief as
reasonable care on the part of others
cannot avoid, otherwise we should have
actions every time a dress, or even a
freshly-painted door, is splashed by a
passing vehicle." The question was
early considered, in Vincent v. Steinhour,
7 Vt. 62, with the conclusion that no
action can be maintained where the injury complained of results from unavoidable accident, and no blame is
imputable.

WILLIAMS, Ch. J., gave a

most satisfactory opinion, citing many
illustrations, and the following cases:
Gibbons v. Pepper, 4 Mod. 405 ; ll'ikeman v. Robinson, 2 Bing. 213 ; Goodman
v. Taylor, 5 C. & P. 410, and some
others.
There is an important point ruled in
the English case, that the defendant i
not liable for doing all he can in such
case to ward off injury from any one,

even though in consequence the blow
upon one who wouhl
ultimately falls
have escaped if no such efforts had been
made. It is like the case of the squib
in Scott v. Sleplerd, 2 W. El. 892 ; 2
Sm. L. C. 210. Fletcher v. Rgjhcnds, L.
Rlep., I Exeh. 286, and Ilarnnark v.
11hIte,
II C. B. N. S. 588, are authorities for the defendant in this class of
I. F. R.
actions.
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Supreme Court of Appeal8 of Virginia.
SPRINKLE v. IIAYWORTH

ET AL.

1

Testator devised to his wife absolutely all his estate, real and personal. The
wife died two days after his death, intestate. Bill is filed by testator's heirs and
next of kin to set up a paro! agreement between testator and his wife, that, at the
death of wife, the property was to be equally divided between the two families.
Held, unlessfraud is alleged and proved, no such trust can be set up by parol.
The limitation over, being of what was left at death of wife, could not be
enforced, even if it had been expressly limited on the face of the will, as such a
limitation would be repugnant to the absolute devisIe and void.

from the Circuit Court of Smyth county.
A. B. Sprinkle, the testator, and his wife, having by their joint
industry amassed quite a large fortune, and never having had any
children, it was their wish and intention, often expressed, that
whatever of their property might be left unexpended and undisposed of at the death of the survivor of them, should be divided
into moieties, one of which should go to the family or collateral
heirs of the husband, and the other to the family or collateral heirs
of the wife. The husband died on the 19th of January 1870.
The wife .survived him only a day or two; having died on the
21st of January 1870. She appeared to have been in usual health
at the time of his death, but almost at once became paralyzed, and
remained so, and generally unconscious, until her death.
By his will he left his entire estate to his wife absolutely. She
died without leaving a will, not having been in a condition to make
one in the short interval between his death and hers.
The bill in the present case was then filed by the heirs at law
and next of kin of the husband against the heirs at law and next
of kin of the wife, for the purpose of setting up and enforcing the
alleged parol understanding and agreement between the husband
and wife, for the equal division of the estate of the husband left
at the death of the wife, between their two families as aforesaid.
Some of the defendants filed their answers to the bill; in which
they denied that there was any such understanding and agreement
between said Sprinkle and wife.
The court decreed that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover
and would then have dismissed the bill ; but it appearing that the
property had been rented out under the order of court, and that
APPEAL

I We are indebted to Air. Gilmore, counsel for the appellees, for the report of this
case.-ED's. AM. LAW REG.
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the transaction on that account remained unsettled, the.cause was
retained for the purpose of such settlement, whereupon plaintiffs
took this appeal. .
B. A. Bihardson and J. TV.
o1 P. iSheffey, for the appel.J.
lants, cited Perry on Trusts, sects. 74, 75, 77, 82, 96; Sanders
on Uses 14, 218, (2 Am. edit.); I'leming v. Donohue, 5 Ohio
250; Bank of Uzited States v. Carrington,7 Leigh 576; Walraven v. Lock, 2 P. & H. 549; 2 Story's Eq. Juris., sects. 20,
32, 44, 57, 781; 1 Blackst. Comm. 92; 3 Greenleaf on Ev., sect.
365; Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Vern. 506; Drakeford v. 11ilrs, 3
Atk. 539: .Podmore v. Gunning, 2 Sim. 644; Barrell v. ranriek,
42 Ala. 60.
John V. Johnston and James IT. Gilmore, for appellees, cited
Wright v. Puckett, 22 Gratt. 374; Pierce's Heirs v. Catron, 23
Grattan 597; Browne on Statute of Frauds, sects. 84, 94, 96;
Perry on Trusts, sect. 94, p. 65; Gilbert's Forum Romanum by
Tyler 328, 329; .Hare v. Shearwood, 1 Yes. 241; .211eCormiek v. Groqan, 4 English and Irish Appeals (1869-70) 82;
Devenish v. Baines, Finch's Prec. in Chanc., case 3,p. 5; Redfield on Wills, part 1, sect. 39, pl. 6, letter d, top of page 546-7 ;
Ibid, sect. 38, pl. 39, pp. 527, 528; Greenleaf on Ev., vol. 1,
sects. 289, 290; Perry on Trusts, sect. 115, pp. 88, 89; May v.
Joynes, 20 Gratt. 692.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
M oNcURE, President.-There never was a will more plainly
written, or one on the face of which there was less room for doubt or
difficulty in the construction of it, than the one we now have before
us. The language of the second clause is: "I will and bequeath to
my beloved wife, Phoebe, all my estate of which I may die possessed, both real and personal, of every description whatsoever;
she having aided me in making all that I have. My desire and
will is that she shall own, absolutely, everything that I may die
possessed of." Could language be more comprehensive or emphatic to invest the wife with the largest possible interest in, and
power over, the estate of the husband ? But to make it still more
plain, if possible, the testator proceeds in the last clause to say:
"As my wife is hereby made my heir and sole devisee, I hereby
constitute and appoint her the executrix of this my last will and
testament, and desire that she shall not be required to give any
official bond."
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And yet, plain as is this written will, the plaintiffs contend that
it ought not to be carried into effect as it is written * that there
was a parol understanding and -agreement between the husband
aid wife, in virtue of which the plaintiffs, his heirs at law and
niext of kin, are entitled to one moiety of the estate left at his
death.
There could be no valid and binding agreement between husband
and wife, as she was not a competent contracting party. Suppose
there was in fact such an understanding between them as the plaintiffs contend for ; could effect be given to it, contrary to the plain
and express language of the written will ?
To give it such effect, would seem to be clearly inadmissible, for
several reasons ; First, because, by the common law, it is a general
rule that a written instrument cannot be varied or contradicted by
parol evidence; and there is nothing in this case to make it an
exception to the general rule ; Secondly, because such an effect
would be contrary to the spirit and true intent and meaning of the
Statute of Frauds, Code, p. 985, ch. 140, sect. 1. And, Thirdly,
because it would be contrary to the Statute of Wills, Code, p. 887,
ch. 112, sect. 1 ; Id., p. 910, ch. 118, sect. 4 ; which declares, that
"no will shall be valid unless it be in writing, and signed by the
testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature; and moreover, unless it be wholly written
by the testator, the signature shall be made, or the will acknowledged by him in the presence of at least two competent witnesses,
present at the same time; and such witnesses shall subscribe the
will in the presence of the testator; but no form of attestation
shall be necessary." And sect. 8th ; which declares that "no will
or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked, unless under the
preceding section (in regard to revocation by marriage), or by a
subsequent will or codicil, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a
-will is required to be executed, or by the testator, or some person
in his presence and by his direction, cutting, tearing, burning, obliterating, cancelling or destroying the same, or the signature
thereto, with the intent to revoke."
It would be strange if, after
all this care taken by the legislature to prevent fraud in the making and revocation of wills, a will, solhmnly made in strict and
literal pursuance of all the requisitions of the statute, could be
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annulled and destroyed by loose declarations of the testator, testified to chiefly by interested parties.
A great deal was said in the argument about the omission in our
statute of the 7th sect. of the Eglish Statute of Frauds, which
declares, that, " all declarations or creations of trust and confidence
of any lands, &c., shall be naiiifested and proved by some writing
signed by the party," &c., and it was argued that while under the
English statute, such a trust as is attempted to be set up in this
case would be invalid, it is valid in this state, for the reason aforesaid.
Certainly a resulting trust is not even within the English Statute
of Frauds, and of course is not within ours. Indeed the 8th sect.
of the English statute, which is also omitted in ours, expressly excludes resulting trusts from the operation of the statute. The case
of the Bank qf U. 8. v. Carrington,,jfc., 7 Leigh 566, referred to
in the argument, was a case of resulting trust. There are other
trusts not strictly coming under the denomination of resulting
trusts, which are not within the statute. TucKER, P., enumerates
many of them, in his opinion in the case just cited. And in 1
Lomax Dig., top page 233, all these trusts are considered under
the denomination of "implied, resulting and constructive trusts."
For peculiar reasons they are excluded from the operation of the
statute.
But without attempting to define these several trusts, or to give
the reason why they are not embraced within the Statute of Frauds,
or to state the effect, if any, of the omission in our statute of the 7th
sect. of the English Statute of Frauds, we think we can safely say,
that even under our Statute of Frauds, if there were'no other
statute or law to prevent it, such a parol understanding or agreement as is set up in the bill, however well proved it may have been,
would be insufficient to contradict or invalidate a will so plainly
written as is the will in this case. It could not have that effect as
a parol declaration or creation of trust, for to give it such an effect
would be to subvert the statute. The most solemn wills and deeds
could then be annulled by loose parol declarations under the name
of trusts. The danger of admitting such declarations for such a
purpose, was demonstrated in ox, .c.v. Cox, decided bythis court
a few days ago. Even in the case of a resulting trust, the proofs
ought to be very clear, if the trust does not arise on the face of the
deed itself. Opinion of BROCKINBnOUGH, J., in the Bank of U.
S. v. Carrington,&c., 7 Leigh 576, and the cases cited by him.
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We do not mean to admit, however, that there is any difference in
effect, between the English Statute of Frauds and ours arising from
the omission in the latter of the 7th and 8th sects. of the former.
That is a question which is unnecessary, and not intended to be
I
decided in this case.
However that ma.y be, we think the Statute of Wills, as before
shown, plainly forbids that a parol will, whether in the form of a
trust or otherwise, shall be set up and established, especially when
there is a written will to the contrary, which hag been executed
and established in strict pursuance of the statute.
To be sure fraud may have the effect of setting aside a deed or
will, or converting a grantee or devisee into a trustee for the benefit of others. The fraud which suffices to lay a foundation for such
a trust is not simply that fraud which is involved in every deliberate breach of contract. The true rule seems to be, that there must
have been an original misrepresentation, by means of which the
legal title was obtained, an original intention to circumvent, and
get a better bargain by the confidence reposed. Thus, as has been
held in many cases, if a man procure a certain devise to be made
to himself by representing to the testator that he will see itapplied
to the trust purposes contemplated by the latter, he will be held
a trustee for those purposes. Brown on the Statute of Frauds,
§ 94. See also Gilbert's Forum Romanum 328-9. There is a
very recent case of the very highest authority in the English books,
which was referred to in the argument of this case by the counsel
for the appellees. and which very strongly illustrates the law on
the branch of the subject we are now considering. We mean MeCorrnick'v. Grogan, decided by the House of Lords in 1869, and
reported in the Law Reports, English and Irish Appeal Cases,
vol. 4, p. 82. The Court of Appeal in Ireland bad reversed a
decretal order of the Lord Chancellor there, and the House of
Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. It does not
appear that there was any dissent from that decision in the House
of Lords. Lord Chancellor IIATHEiRLEY and Lord WESTBURY delivered seriatim opinions in the case, and Lord CAIRNs expressed his
entire concurrence in their opinions. We will have occasion to
refer to that case again. We will now notice only so much of it
as relates to the branch of the subject we are now considering.
The Lord Chancellor, after stating several cases in which a devisee
had been held to be a trustee, upon parol proof of a fraud committed by him in procuring the devise, thus proceeds: "But this

.
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doctrine evidently requires to be carefilly restricted within proper
limits. It is in itself a doctrine which involves a wide departure
from the policy which induced the legislature to pass the Statute
of Frauds, and it is only in clear cases of fraud that the doctrine
has been applied, cases in which the court has been'persuaded that
there has been a frauduleni inducement held out on the part nf the
apparent beneficiary in order to lead the testator to confide to him
the duty which he so undertook to perform." And Lord W-sTBU RY said : "the jurisdiction which is invoked here by the appelant is founded altogether on personal fraud. It is a jurisdiction
by which a court of equity, proceeding on the ground of fraud,
converts the party who has committed it into a trustee for the party
who is injured by that fraud. Now, being a jurisdiction founded
on personal fraud, it is incumbent on the court to see that a fraud,
a malus animus, is proved by the clearest and most indisputable
evidence." Much more was said by his lordship which bears on
the point now under consideration; but for the present we will
quote no more from the case.
In this case certainly there is not a particle of proof, nor is it
pretended that there was any fraud on the part of the devisee to
induce the devise; nor that she would not, if she had lived long
enough, have made such a disposition of the property as is now
claimed by the appellants ; not in discharge of an obligation which
could be enforced in a court of law or equity, but as a voluntary
act, in pursuance of what she no doubt believed were the wishes
of her husband.
We are therefore of opinion that the parol evidence in this case
was inadmissible to alter or contradict the will, or set up a trust
under the same.
We arc also of opinion, that even if the evidence were admissible, it would be insufficient to prove such a trust as is claimed in
this case. The will itself, certainly, shows the intention of the
testator more plainly than the parol declarations made by the testator and his wife, testified to, as they chiefly are; by interested
parties. The will, as we have seen, is very plainly expressed ; as
if the testator was careful to exclude the idea that his wife should
be considered as holding the property for the benefit, ultimately,
of'the heirs of the two families respectively, according to the claim
set up in this suit, and not for her own exclusive and absolute use.
If,really, the testator had intended to give these two families, or
either of them, any interest in remainder in his estate, he would
VOL. XXIV.-6
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have done so expressly in his will.

lie would, for example, have

given a moiety of his estate to his wifi absolutely, and the other
moiety to her for life, with remainder to his own right heirs and
next of kin. That he did not plainly do so, which he could so
easily have dolie, is strong, if not conclusive, evidence to show
le was not taken by surprise by
that lie did not intend to do so.
death. His will was well and carefully prepared, obviously by a
lawyer, more than a year before his death; and is, in substance,
the same with a will which lie had executed seventeen or eighteen
years before. It was his deliberate and cherished purpose to make
it as he did ; and he meant what he said; whatever may have
been his wishes in regard to the distribution of any of the property
which might remain unexpended or undIsposed of at her death,
those wishes were altogether subordinate to his main intention,
to leave all his estate of which he might die possessed, both real
and personal, of every description whatsoever, to his wife; and
that she should own absolutely everything that he might die possessed of. Though sometimes advised to name in his will, his
wishes in regard to the ultimate distribution of the property which
might be left at his wife's death, he carefully avoided doing so, lest
his wife might thereby be restrained and limited in some d.egree in
the use and enjoyment of the property. If he had survived her,
the property would certainly have been his absolutely, to dispose
of as he pleased, and he could not have been restrained in such
disposition by his heirs at law or those of his wife, upon the ground
of any trust in their favor arising from the loose conversation between him and his wife or otherwise. As she survived him he
intended to leave her in his place; and to give her the property
and all power over it to the same absolute extent to which he
would have held and enjoyed it had he been the survivor. He did
not know how long she would live, nor what occasion she might
have for the use of the property after his death, and therefore he
gave it to her absolutely. He had perfect confidence in her, and
was willing td give it to her absolutely ; trusting and believing
that she would do what was right when she came to dispose of
of what property might remain undisposed of at her death. [The
learned judge here proceeds to discuss the testimony filed in the
case and to urge its unsatisfactory nature, all which we omit.]

The Virginia case to which we refer is that of Mlay v. Joynes,
20 Gratt. 692, decided by this court in 1857, but not reported
2c.,
until 1871. The following is the marginal abstract of the case by
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the reporter: " Testator says, I give to my beloved and exeelle,,t
wife, subject to the provisions hereafter declared, my whole estate,
real and personal, and especially all real estate which I may hereafter acquire, to have during her life, but with full power to make
sale of any part of the said estate, and to convey absolute title to
the purchasers; and use the purchase-money for investment or any
purpose that she pleases ; with only this restriction, that whatever
remains at her death shall, after paying any debts she may owe,
or aniy legacies she may leave, be divided as foilows: there are
then limitations to his children and grandchildren. Held, The
wife takes a fee simple in the real, and an absolute property in the
personal, estate, and the limitation over of whatever remains at
her death is inconsistent with, and repugnant to, such fee simple
and absolute property in said real and personal estate, and fails
for uncertainty." ALLEN, P., delivered the opinion of the court,
in which all the other judges but SAMUELS, J., concurred. The
case was very ably argued by distinguished counsel, and their
arguments are fully reported. They refer to all the material
authorities bearing on the interesting question involved in the case,
which was: whether a remainder over, limited on an express estate
for life, was rendered invalid by a power of disposition given to
the tenant for life for her own use over the principal of the estate,
or any part of it?
We think that case was a much stronger one in favor of the
limitation over than this case is. For there, the estate on which
the limitation depended was an express estate for life; while here,
it is a fee simple and absolute estate. There, the limitation over
was expressed in the will. Here, there is no allusion whatever to
it in the will. If the limitation over in that case was repugnant
to the estate given to the wife, 8 fortiori the limitation over in
this case was repugnant to the estate given to the wife.
If the testator had foreseen the death of his wife so soon after
his death, without having time or opportunity, or being in a condition, to make a will, or had thought of such a contingency as
likely to take place, he would no doubt have provided for it by his
will, and disposed of the property among the heirs of both parties,
according to what he knew to be the wishes of both in such an
event. But he made no such provision; and whatever may have
been the cause of the omission, this court cannot supply it. To do
so, would be to make a will for the testator, and not to construe
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and give effect to the will as made by himself. The latter is our
only legitimate ofAce. The former is beyond our power.
In every view of the ease, therefore, we are of opinion that
there is no error in the decree appealed from, and that it ought to
be affirmed.
The foregoing opinion discusses many
of the same questions involved in the
case of Dowd v. Tucker, ante, vol. 14,
p. 477. Our note to the latter case
renders it improper to pass over the
same grounds which we have already
there sufficiently considered. But we
are gratified to be able to present the
profession the views of an experienced
judge more in detail than was attempted
in the former case. The grounds of the
present decision are far more obvious
and familiar to the profession than those
in the former case, since every lawyer,
at the present day, comprehends at first
blush the general rule of law, that a
will, made under a statute requiring all
wills to he in.writing, and executed before witnesses, cannot be controlled by
any oral understanding with the testator
in regard to the ultimate disposition of
the estate embraced. It would, as urged
by the learned judge, in his opinion in the
principal case, be a virtual repeal of the
statute, to allow the instrument to be enlarged, or in any way controlled, by extraneous testimony. But the exceptions
to this general rule, founded upon either
fraud, or trust in procuring the will, in
the particular form in which it was executed, through assurances made by interested parties under it, to use the
estate for the benefit of others not named
in the instrument, but intended by the
testator to derive a benefit through the
beneficiary named in it, are far more
difficult to define. These exceptions are
the same, and founded upon precisely
the same principles, with the similar exceptions under the Statute of Frauds.
They rest upon an implied trust growing out of an attempted fraud. The
principle involved is, that the courts

will not allow any one to wrest the provisions of the statute, to the accomplishment of injustice, through the literal application of the terms of the
same contrary to its spirit and intent.
The principle is one which meets with
much contradiction and criticism from
those who desife to be left in possession
of their ill-gotten gains; but it still
maintains its ground against all the
irony and reproach heaped upon it. So
long as the courts base their exceptions
to statutes upon the prevention of attempted frauds, the public and the profession ag-e not likely to make any loud
remonstrances, however loudly sciolists and interested parties may remonstrate. There will always be found
some men in all professions ready to
sacrifice justice to symmetry, but in a
healthy state of public sentiment they
will have few followers.
It is upon the grounds before stated
that courts of equity in England have
controlled even the probate of wills
when fraudulently obtained: Gin.qell v.
Horn, 9 Simons 539 ; Lord HARDWICxE, in Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves.,
sen. 119, 284, 287. But this will now
be done, after probate, only in very extreme eases, and where otherwise there
would be no remedy for the injustice
otherwise perpetrated. The question is
extensively discussed in Allen v. Macpherson, I Phill. C. C. 133, by Lord'
LvNsnuPST, Chancellor; and thejudg-:
ment affirmed in the House of Lords :i
1 "ho. Lds. C. 191, where Lord LYNIURST thus enumerates the cases in
which the courts of equity will intervene in questions of construction, or
wh6re the party is named as trustee, and
where the Court of Probate could afford
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no adequate remedy, or where one
name is fraudulently inserted in the
will in the place of another intended by

the testator. See 3 Redfield on Wills
59, 60, where the question is further disI. F. R.
cussed.
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UNITED STATES v. ADLER & FURST.
The offence of failing to efface and obliterate the marks, stamps and brands required by law to be upon a package of distilled spirits at the time of emptying the
package is complete without any intent to defraud, or any purpose to violate the
law.
If a person causes a package of distilled spirits to be emptied, it is a personal
duty resting upon him to see that the marks, stamps and brands thereon, are effaced
and obliterated at the time the package is emptied, and responsibility for a failure
to perform this duty cannot be shifted from himself by directing another to do the
same for him.
The owners and operators of a rectifying establishment engaginghands, furnishing materials and receiving the profits of the business, may be said to cause the
emptying the distilled spirits used in their business by those in their employ.
A principal, who causes a package of distilled spirits to be emptied by an employee, is bound to see that the marks, stamps and brands thereon are effaced and
obliterated at the time the same is emptied. If he trusts the performance of this
duty to an employee, he does so at big peril, and if the employee fails to do it,
such failure is equally the failure of the principal.

THIS was an indictment charging that defendants did empty, or
caused to be emptied, certain casks, or packages of distilled spirits,
without defacing or obliterating the stamps, marks and brands
thereupon, at the time of emptying thereof.
The testimony showed that defendants were rectifiers at St.
Joseph; that the process of rectifying was carried on by two employees of the firm, at a house some three or four blocks away from
the firm's regular place of business; that these employees, Henry
Korf and Charles Jagau, did all the work of emptying, and that
defendants were neither of them present except on a few occasions;
that a large number of packages of spirits were received from the
distillery of Edward Sheehan & Son, and emptied by these employees, and that the stamps of these packages reappeared on
packages subsequently sold by Sheehan & Son to other parties.
One of the employees, Korf, stated on the witness stand that he
and Jagau stole the stamps from these packages, and returned them
to the distillery without the knowledge of defendants.
James. S. Botsford and Hf. B. Johnson, for the United States.
Chester ff. Krum and Jeff. C. Chandler, for the defendants.
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KEREL, J., charged the jury as follows :-Under a statute of
the United States regarding internal revenue, Adler & Furst, the
defendants, have been indicted for failing to deface and obliterate
from casks or packages of distilled spirits, at the time of emptying,
marks, brands and stamps required by law to be thereon. The
indictment, in fifty-eight counts, charges this offence, varying in
manner and the packages'regarding which the omission occurred,
so as to meet the testimony in the case. The United States Statutes, in sect. 3324, under which the indictment has been found,
provide that "every person who empties or draws off, or causes to
be emptied or drawn off, any distilled spirits from a cask or package bearing any mark, brand or stamp required by law, shall at
the time of emptying such cask or package, efface or obliterate said
mark, stamp or brand. * * * Every person who fails to efface and
obliterate said mark, stamp or brand at the time of emptying such
cask or package, shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall be
fined, etc."
I have cited such parts of the section only as bear directly upon
the issues. You will observe, in the first place, that the section
begins with declaring it to be the duty of every person who
empties or draws off, or causes to be emptied or drawn off, any
spirits, at the time of emptying such cask or package, to efface
and obliterate said mark, stamp or brand. The object of the provision obviously was to secure the destruction of the mark, stamp
or brand at the time of emptying; and the words "shall efface
and obliterate" are apt words to express that intention. The
language, "at the time of emptying such cask or package," leaves
no room for construction as to ihe time when the act of effacing
and obliterating is to be done. It must be done at the time of
emptying and at no other time. The object in so providing was
no doubt to prevent the opportunity of defrauding the government
by an improper use of the package or stamps, or both. The law,
however, will not require an impossibility, and if a case was presented in which the person whose duty the law makes it to efface
and obliterate, without any fault of his own, was prevented from
the discharge of the duty imposed on him; the law might excuse
him. Such a case, however, is not before you, for there is no evidence tending to show even that the party upon whom the obligation to "obliterate and efface" rested was in any way interfered
with or prevented from doing so. But the important inquiry is,
upon whom, under the testimony before you, did the law impose
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the duty of cancelling and effacing? Was it upon Adler & Furst,
the defendants ? And if so, are they responsible for the acts of
their employees? In reading the clause of the section pronouncing the penalty as a separate and distinct part of the section,
countenance may be found for the construction that the penalty
was denounced against the-person only who did the act of emptying. A close examination of the language of the part of the
section denouncing the penalty shows beyond a doubt that it refers
to the duty which the section in its beginning imposes, for it provides that every person who fails to efface and obliterate SAID
mark, stamp or brand at the time of emptying, etc.
As we have already seen, the provisions of the section imposing
the duty to efface and obliterate is of such mark, brand or stamp
only, as are requiredby law to be upon casks or packages, and
hence the language in the penalty clause-SAID mark, stamp or
brand. To read the penalty clause without reference to the preceding one would leave us without any designation as to what
mark, brand or stamp the law is applicable to. To read the provision providing the penalty, in connection with the clause imposing
the duty of effacing and obliterating such mark, brand or stamp
required by law to be upon casks and packages, gives us an intelligent reading of the statute.
But it does more. The construing of the duty and penalty
clause together enables us to ascertain to whom the statute applies,
namely: to "every person who empties or draws off, or causes
to be emptied or drawn off, any distilled spirits." Such a construction, in entire harmony with the provisions of the statute,
accomplishes its evident object to hold those responsible, among
others, who cause the drawing off. This leads us to the question
under the evidence whether a person or partnership engaged in
rectifying and employing persons who empty distilled spirits from
casks and packages bearing marks, brands and stamps required
thereon by law, can be said to cause the emptying or drawing off
of such spirits. The owners, possessors and operators of a rectifying establishment engaging hands, furnishing the materials and
receiving its products, may be said to cause the emptying of spirits
used in their business by those in their employ. And any failure
on their part to efface and obliterate marks, stamps or brands at
the time of emptying casks or packages of distilled spirits on which
cask or package marks, stamps and brands were required by law,
or cans the same to be done, such person or persons so causing
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the emptying without effacing or obliterating such mark, brand or
stamp is amenable to the law. The jury are instructed that if
they find from the evidence that Adler & Furst were rectifiers and
carrying on a rectifying establishment in the Western District of
Missouri; that they emptied or caused to be emptied by their employees, as explained, any distilled spirits from casks or packages
bearing any mark, brand or stamp required by law, and failed to
efface and obliterate said mark, stamp or brand, at the time of
emptying such cask or package, as charged in the indictment, they
should find the defendants guilty, otherwise acquit. It was the
duty of Adler & Furst, the defendants, to efface or obliterate the
marks, brands and stamps on emptying, or cause it to be done, and
the failure of their employees to do what the law imposes as a duty
on them does not excuse them.
Verdict, " Guilty on all counts except the first."
The offenec charged in this case is a
.fdony. The important question discussed by counsel and decided by the
court was whether the accused could be
guilty without a criminal intent. The
broad principle was ably maintained by
the counsel for defendants that there
can be no crime punishable by law, unless there has been a criminal act or
omission, and a criminal or unlawful
intent, and this we find laid down as
a fundamental principle of criminal
law: United States v. Thoinasson, 4
Biss. 99 ; Giltner v. Gorham, 4 McLean
402. On the other hand the counsel
for the government maintained that
criminal intent was no clement of the
statutory offence, and need not exist to
render it complete. There has been no
adjudication of the precise question arising upon this statute, but general principles were relied on as asserted in
numerous authorities: United States v.
Taylor, 5 McLean 242; United States
v. Distilled Spirits, 3 Ben. 552 ; Hunter
v. State, I Head 160; Cliquot's Chainpagne, 3 Wall. 140; United States v.
Whiskey, 11 Int. Rev. Rec. 94; United
States v. Ten Barrels, 11 Int. Rev. Rec.
5 ; Story on Partnership, ?. 166 ; Story
on Agency, 452 ; Collier on Partnership, 459.

The view maintained by the counsel
for the government and sanctioned by
the court, is not only in harmony with
the plain woriding of the statute, but
derives support from many kindred provisions of the revenue laws of the United
States and from their general.spirit and
policy. It may be profitable to make
brief reference to some of the provisions.
Section 3169 punishes the failure by
any revenue officer to report to his next
superior officer and to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue his knowledge or
information of all violations of the revenue laws of the United States or of
frauds committed against the United
States undcr such revenue laws. Section 3242 punishes rectifiers, wholesale
liquor dealers, retail liquor dealers, and
manufacturers of stills .failing to pay
their special taxes. Section 3239 punishes a failure through negligence to conspicuously post special tax stamp. Section 3258 punishes the failure of any
person having any still or distilling apparatus set up to register the same with
the collector. Section 3259 punishes
every distiller and rectifier failing to
give notice to the collector of the commencement of his business. Section
3260 punishes the failure of every distiller to give a bond. Section 3279
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punishes the faiure of every distiller
petuity. These rules should be liberand rectifier to place a sign on his ally construed so as to advance the
house. Section 3318 punishes the ftii- high purpose for which they were enure of every rectifier and whiolesale
acted: 1-nited States v. Twnty-eiyl,t
liquor dealer to keep books cr to manke Cascs 2 Be.i. OC" Cliqz)'. (',anipayno,
entries therein. Section ?341) 1puri~1es
3 Wall. '44 .- j'ygr V. Udtcd States,
the failure of every brewer to -keep 3 How. 210. The fact that the ofstatute to be a
books. Section 3342 punishes the i'.l-femce is d2ae.l 'the
ure of a brewer to affix and cancel ,he .elony, do.i n.. 6rau-ge the construction
which it should otherwise receive : Unistamps on beer kegs.
The provision of the statute which was ted States r. Stunts, 8 How. 41 ; United
drawn in question in the above reported States v. Yhornpsoa, 6 McLean 56. The
case belongs to the same class of provi- distinction between folonies and misdesions as those noted above, and they meanors is, under Federal legislation
all form a part of that system of con- and in the Federal courts, more nominal
ventional rules adopted by the gov- than real or practical.
H. B. JouxsoN.
ernment for the collection of the revenue necessary to its existence and per-

United States District Court, Western District of Missouri.
UNITED STATES v. BITTINGER.
A person is a witness within the meaning of the statute (Revised Statutes U. S.,
5399) who has been designated as such either by the issuance of a subpoena or
by the endorsement of his name on a complaint. The subpcena need not have
been served.
A case is pending in a court of the United States in contemplation of said
statute, when a complaint is Iodged with the United States Commissioner charging
a violation of the laws of the United States.
Before any one can be said to have endeavored to corruptly influence a witness,
he must have known that the witness had been properly designated as such.

THIs was an indictment drawn under section 5399 of the Revised Statutes:
"Every person who corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavors
to influence, intimidate or impede any witness or officer in any court
of the United States in the discharge of his duty, or corruptly or
by threats or force obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct
or impede, the due administration of justice therein, shall be punished," &c.
James S. Botsford and ff. B. Johnson, for the United States.

Willard P. Hall and Jeff. C. Chandler, for the defendant.
KREKEL, J., charged the jury as follows :-The statute aims at
defining two classes of offences; first, the endeavor to improperly
influence, intimidate or impede a witness or officer in the discharge
VOL. XXIV.-7
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of a duty in any court of the United States by corrupt means,
such as bribery, or by threats or force.
It contemplates a case in which an attempt is made to directly
interfere with a witness, and to impropfily and illegally influence
him. A witi'ess, in the meaning of the statute and under the
evidence in this case, will be taken by you to be a person for whom
a subpcena had 4,ssued on part of the [United States to appear
before a U. S. Commissioner to testify on a charge for violation of
the laws of the United States. A case, under the evidence before
you, is pending in a court of the United States, when a complahit
is lodged with a U. S. Commissioner charging a violation of the
laws of the United States.
Before any one can be said to have endeavored to corruptly influence a witness, he must have known that the witness had been
designated by the U. S. District Attorney, or the Commissioner,
as one to be used as a witness.
The designation may be by the issuing of a subpoena, or by the
endorsement of his name on a complaint, designating the witness
by name, as such.
If the jury shall be satisfied from the evidence, that defendant
Bittinger knew that a subpoena had been issued for Ferdinand
Rendelman, or that Rendelman's name was endorsed on a complaint charging the defendant named therein with an offence
against the laws of the *United States, and if they shall further
find that he corruptly influenced the said Rendelman to secrete,
or so digpose of himself as to prevent process to be served on hini,
and if the jury shall further find that Rendelman had knowledge
that such was the intention and object of the defendant, they
should find the defendant guilty under the first count of the indictment.
If the jury shall find that no steps had been taken, either by
the U. S. District Attorney or the U. S. Commissioner, to desiguiate said .Rendelman as a witness, either by an endorsement of
his name on the complaint, or the issuing of a subpoena, or that
the defendant had no'knowledge that said Re.delman had been ,o
'1-signated as a witness, before the alleged interference, you should
find the defendant not guilty under said first count.
The second class of offences which tle section of the law cited
denounces, is "corruptly, or by threats or force, obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration
of justice."
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1o particular class of persons are named in this last clause.
The words "influence and intimidate," employed in the first clause,
are dropped, and "due administration of justice in court" added,
showing an intention to extend the application of the statute.
Applying the provisions last quoted to the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th
counts of the indictment, it will be necessary for you to find that
the defendant, Bittinger, did some act or acts which obstructed or
impeded the due administration of justice.
We have seen, so far as an interference with a witness who had
a duty in the United States court to discharge is concerned, the
offence comes within the first subdivision of the act. This being
the case, the defendant, in order to be found guilty of obstructing
the due administration of justice in any court of the United States,
must have done, if not more, at least some act or acts in addition
to those specified in the first subdivision of the statute we are considering, in order to find him guilty of having corruptly obstructed
the due administration of justice.
There seems to be no other act of the defendant interfering
with the due administration of justice testified to, than his interference with the witness Rendelman, and unless this interference
can be construed into an obstruction of the due administration of
justice, there would seem to be no evidence supporting the last four
counts of the indictment. It would be, to say the least, a very
doubtful construction, to seek to bring the offence from under the
first and more definite description, for the purpose of applying the
more general provision to the second class of offences, and you are
not to do so unless you are satisfied the testimony in the case will
justify it. You will have to determine from the evidence whether
a case is made out against the defendant on the 1st, or the 2d, 3d,
4th and 5th counts of the indictment. These last four counts
charge the corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice before the U. S. Commissioner and in the
District Court.
There is but one offence charged to have been committed, and
it is your duty to say, if you find the defendant guilty, under what
count of the indictment, bearing in mind, that the first count
charges the corrupt interference with the witness, and the four last
the corrupt obstruction of the administration of justice in the DisVerdict, "Guilty on all the counts."
trict Court.
The principal legal point made by the
defence in the above reported case was,

that, as the statute only punishes the
corrupt influencing of a witness in the

